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Comment
WHEN GOING GREEN MEANS GOING INTO THE RED:
PENNSYLVANIA’S STRUGGLE FUNDING STORMWATER
REGULATIONS CREATES WATER WOES
FOR MS4S
HANNAH SCHROER*
“I say, oh, I am miserable,
What shall—
What should I do? And the sea says
in its lovely voice:
Excuse me, I have work to do.”1
I. STEPPING

INTO THE

WATER: AN INTRODUCTION

The City of Lebanon could manage compliance costs until the regulations changed for the third time.2 A small city with 25,000 residents, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulated
Lebanon as a point-source polluter since 2003.3 But a series of rapid-fire
regulatory changes drove up the city’s cost of compliance to $1.4 million
annually and forced it to find new revenue to stay afloat.4
* I would like to thank my parents, who are the wellspring of my passion for
writing and stormwater runoff. The Villanova community provided me with
boundless encouragement and excellent advice during the writing process, for
which I am grateful. I also extend my love and thanks especially to Jacob Schroer,
Gidget Zakar, and Carver Edlund, without whom I would have been swept away by
this project.
1. MARY OLIVER, I Go down to the Shore, in A THOUSAND MORNINGS: POEMS 1, 1
(2013).
2. See Presentation on Regulatory Compliance and Costs Associated with Stormwater
Management Before the H. Comm. on Environmental Resources & Energy and H. Comm.
on Local Government, 2019 Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. 60–63 (Pa. 2019) (statement of
Sherry Capello, Mayor of Lebanon, PA) [hereinafter Stormwater Hearing] (describing Lebanon’s struggle to meet changing state environmental regulations).
3. See id. at 60. (discussing origins of DEP regulation). Lebanon’s storm sewer
outflows into the Susquehanna River. See id. at 62. The DEP’s initial requirements
were fairly lax and able to be covered by the city’s general budget. See id. at 60.
4. See id. at 63, 71 (discussing financial hardships). After 2015, the DEP imposed on Lebanon with harder permitting requirements that required the city to
measure its pollution outflow and implement a pollution reduction plan. See id. at
60. After the city complied, the state changed its target in 2016 and requested
Lebanon create a new pollution reduction plan within one year that showed a plan
to reduce the city’s sediment, phosphorous, and nitrogen outflows by 10%, 5%,
and 3% respectively. See id. at 60–61. Adding to the confusion, the DEP determined that street sweeping was not as effective at reducing pollution as previously
thought and decreased the credit the city could earn toward its pollution reduc-
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The current struggle of small Pennsylvanian communities is one piece
of a regulatory puzzle assembled over more than thirty years to revitalize
the Chesapeake Bay (the Bay).5 At forty million acres, the Chesapeake
Bay watershed is the focus of a multi-state, federally mandated effort to
restore the Bay’s water quality by 2025.6 Once a thriving mix of coast and
wetland lush with aquatic plant life and uniquely adapted species, 80% of
the Chesapeake Bay’s tidal floodwaters are listed as partially or fully impaired by pollution.7 The lion’s share of that pollution washes down from
Pennsylvania through the Susquehanna River.8
Pennsylvania, filling one-third of the watershed, faces the toughest
path to reducing pollution in the Bay.9 Half of the Commonwealth drains
tion plan from 85% to 9%, effectively stripping the city of its major source of compliance and leaving it with an expensive capital purchase that would no longer pay
for itself. See id. at 77–78.
5. See Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and
the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,208, 10,218 (2011) (recognizing point
source pollution as a small piece of the pollution problem). While municipal
stormwater runoff is a recognized offender, most pollution in the Bay has agricultural origins. See id. at 10,214. Existing point sources make up only 20% of the
Bay’s pollution load and 92% of these sources already have NPDES permits. See id.
at 10,224.
6. See id. at 10,209 (describing Chesapeake Bay’s status). The Chesapeake Bay
watershed restoration project is the biggest and most challenging in the world. See
id. The watershed drains 64,000 square miles of land. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) FACT SHEET 1 (2015), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/bay_tmdl_fact_sheet
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZC4-QJGD] (explaining what a TMDL is). A Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) caps the amount of pollution allowed into a body of
water at a limit that can sustain safe water quality standards. See id.
7. See Pollution, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, chesapeakebay.net/state/pollution
[https://perma.cc/R37G-VGK3] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (highlighting extent
of pollution in the Chesapeake Bay). See generally Basic Information About Estuaries,
EPA https://www.epa.gov/nep/basic-information-about-estuaries [https://perma
.cc/8U6S-ZLJL] (last updated Dec. 7, 2016) (describing estuaries).
8. See Agriculture, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, chesapeakebay.net/issues/agriculture [https://perma.cc/QXA4-5PA2] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) (summarizing
agricultural contributions to Bay pollution); see also Annabelle Klopman, Comment, An Undercurrent of Discontent: The Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load
and Its Impact on Bay Industries, 24 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 98–99 (2013) (describing
agricultural contribution to Chesapeake Bay pollution). There are 88,000 farms
releasing polluted runoff, which carries 42% of the nitrogen, 55% of the phosphorus, and 60% of the sediment reaching the Bay. See id. Pennsylvania farms
make up roughly half of the farms within the Chesapeake Bay watershed. See id. at
109; see also David McFadden, Experts Warn of ‘Dead Zone’ in Chesapeake Bay from
Pollution, BALT. SUN (July 07, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/environment/bs-md-conowingo-pollutants-rainfall-chesapeake-20190706-story.html
[https://perma.cc/C2MV-R788] (warning of excess sediment pollution causing
dead zone in Chesapeake Bay).
9. See Chesapeake Bay Watershed Pollution Limits, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND.,
https://www.cbf.org/how-we-save-the-bay/chesapeake-clean-water-blueprint/pollution-limits/index.html [https://perma.cc/U3WX-TN2C] (last visited Aug. 17,
2019) (providing updates on pollution reduction efforts and projections on pollution levels relative to the 2025 goals of the program); see also ENVTL. FIN. CTR.,
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to the Chesapeake Bay, and one quarter of that land is farmland.10 Despite heightened regulations on point-source polluters and a growing
number of incentives for farmers to undertake conservation actions, a
$256 million funding gap indicates Pennsylvania will not meet its mandated pollution reduction goal by the 2025 deadline.11
Pennsylvania’s current focus on meeting the Bay’s “pollution diet” by
imposing stricter requirements on municipalities, while failing to monitor
agricultural compliance, will kill the entire endeavor.12 The state’s approach of more intensely regulating point source polluters raises costs for
local municipalities but does not decrease the state’s pollution output to
below its designated pollution cap.13 In order to meet the Bay’s 2025 resFINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WATER QUALITY PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ON AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN PENNSYLVANIA (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.chesapeakebay
.net/channel_files/23872/financial_incentives_for_conservation_on_ag_lands_928-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6FJ-RC95] (providing background on Chesapeake
Bay watershed); see also Pennsylvania’s Chesapeake Bay Plan, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT.,
https://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Water/Pennsylvania%e2%80%99s%20Chesa
peake%20Bay%20Program%20Office/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
U2VL-D3AM] (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (providing overview of state’s Chesapeake
Bay strategy). Stormwater runoff impairs more than 11,400 miles of Pennsylvanian
streams within the Chesapeake Bay watershed. See id.
10. See ENVTL. FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 6 (discussing Pennsylvania section of
Bay watershed); see also Press Release, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Majority of Conservation Districts in Bay Watershed Agree to Work with DEP to Reduce Runoff (Sept. 13,
2016), http://www.ahs.dep.pa.gov/NewsRoomPublic/articleviewer.aspx?id=21065
&typeid=1 13 [https://perma.cc/EVV6-W3XL] (discussing magnitude of conservation effort).
11. See Ben Finley, Chesapeake Bay Foundation Slams Pennsylvania’s Plan to Reduce Pollution as ‘Woefully Inadequate,’ BALT. SUN (May 28, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/environment/bs-md-chesapeake-bay-report-20190528-story
.html [https://perma.cc/F5LD-FN3H] (reporting criticisms of Pennsylvania’s
Phase III reduction plan); see also Meg Wilburn Viviano, Critics: “Sue Pennsylvania”
over Bay Cleanup Shortfall, CHESAPEAKE BAY MAG. (July 19, 2019), https://
chesapeakebaymagazine.com/critics-sue-pennsylvania-over-bay-cleanup-shortfall/
[https://perma.cc/T7C3-7X9C] (noting negative reaction to Pennsylvania’s Draft
Phase III WIP).
12. See Karl Blankenship, States’ Latest Bay Cleanup Plans Found Lacking by EPA,
BAY J. (July 09, 2019), https://www.bayjournal.com/article/states_latest_bay_
cleanup_plans_found_lacking_by_epa [https://perma.cc/QH4J-C5UN] (discussing cause of most Chesapeake Bay pollution). Nitrogen, the cause of dreaded algal blooms and many dead zones, is the key to saving the Chesapeake Bay. See id.
Because most of the Bay’s current pollution shortfall is from Pennsylvania nitrogen, Pennsylvania’s failure to reduce nitrogen pollution in upcoming years would
ensure the entire jurisdiction misses its 2025 federal deadline. See id. Agriculture
is the largest source of nutrients for the Chesapeake Bay and will thus be the most
important area to focus on in any new plan to reduce pollution. See id.
13. See PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., 2018 PENN. INTEGRATED WATER QUALITY MONITORING & ASSISTANCE REPORT (2018) [hereinafter 2018 INTEGRATED REPORT],
https://www.depgis.state.pa.us/2018_integrated_report/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/83BS-FNRK] (stating Pennsylvania number of permitted municipalities
within watershed); see also Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2, at 47 (statement of Jeffrey Stonehill, Chambersburg Borough Manager) (testifying about municipalities’
difficulties affording stormwater improvements). The 340 municipalities within
the watershed regulated under the NPDES point source permitting program must
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toration deadline, Pennsylvania must monitor and enforce regulations on
agricultural non-point source polluters or risk having the EPA pass down
even stronger regulations on already struggling municipalities.14
Part II of this Comment provides background on federal stormwater
regulation of municipalities compared to farmers, the long effort of states
and conservationists to clean the Chesapeake Bay, and the lead up to the
EPA’s declaration of a total maximum daily load (TMDL) across the Chesapeake Bay.15 Part III focuses on Pennsylvania’s approach to stormwater
management and the different techniques used to regulate municipalities
versus farmers within the Chesapeake Bay watershed.16 Part IV critiques
the state’s carrot-and-stick approach as both inequitable and an inefficient
use of resources.17 Part V discusses how political uncertainty is preventing
Pennsylvania from reaching its 2025 goal and putting municipalities in a
legally vulnerable position.18
II. REMINISCING ON THE GOOD OL’ DAYS: AN OVERVIEW
OF STORMWATER REGULATIONS
Stormwater runoff is indiscriminate: it accumulates from storms,
snow, and ice melt; it runs through lawns, streets, forests, and farms.19
hire engineers to create stormwater models and projections to show they are actually measuring and trying to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment pollution
before the DEP will approve a permit. See Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2, at
42–45. Municipalities are passing the regulatory cost on to property owners in the
form of stormwater user fees, the revenue from which can double annual
stormwater infrastructure budgets. See id. at 57; see also Blankenship, supra note 12
(expressing doubt on whether the current proposed plans to reduce pollution can
succeed without a proper focus on reducing discharge from agricultural sources).
14. See ENVTL. FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 6 (describing EPA’s backstop measures after Pennsylvania failed to meet its 2016 milestone goal). When Pennsylvania failed to reach 60% of its 2025 pollution goal by 2016, the EPA
implemented backstop measures that led to more rigorous point-source pollution
regulations for local governments to fund. See id.
15. For a further discussion of the legal context of Pennsylvania’s current
stormwater regulatory scheme, see Part II infra.
16. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s bisected approach to
stormwater regulations, see Part III infra.
17. For a further discussion of state oversight of Chesapeake Bay restoration
project, see Part IV infra.
18. For a further discussion of a prediction of how Pennsylvania’s current
stormwater strategy with impact the Commonwealth’s citizens, see Part V infra.
19. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, Fifty Shades of Gray Infrastructure: Land Use and
the Failure to Create Resilient Cities, 93 WASH. L. REV. 317, 322 (2018) (criticizing land
use laws for increasing stormwater); see also David Unkovic & J. Adam Matlawski,
How Should Regional Stormwater Systems Be Structured and Financed?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 22, 2014) (noting the varied sources where stormwater runoff may
be collected from); Polluted Runoff, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., https://www.cbf.org/
issues/polluted-runoff/index.html [https://perma.cc/83BS-FNRK] (last visited
Aug. 8, 2019) (explaining how harmful runoff pollution is to Chesapeake Bay).
Because of their default presumption that development includes gray infrastructure and impervious surfaces, land use laws offer no solution to the stormwater
runoff problem. See Rosenbloom, supra, at 322.
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The byproduct of land development, stormwater picks up debris and pollution in its path—wherever its destination.20 The only true difference
between point source and non-point source runoff is how government
agencies regulate it and what those distinctions mean for water quality
standards.21
This Part covers the history of urban and agricultural regulations
under the Clean Water Act and the longstanding cleanup efforts in the
Chesapeake Bay.22 Section II.A covers municipal stormwater regulations
under the Clean Water Act, including its creation and delegation of responsibility to states.23 Section II.B looks at the relationship between the
federal government and the agriculture industry, particularly in the regulation of large farms under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) and the role of manure in non-point source pollution.24
Section II.C explores the long history of cleanup efforts in the Chesapeake
Bay, including Phases I and II of the three-part TMDL established by the
EPA.25
A.

The Mean Streets: A History of Municipal Stormwater Regulation

Municipalities, traditional point source polluters, control the runoff
flowing through their streets using gray infrastructure—a series of catch
basins, holding reservoirs, and outlets connected by underground piping—as opposed to green infrastructure, which includes manmade elements replicating natural water infiltration.26 Gray infrastructure systems
are well established in municipal land use laws, making it easier for devel20. See David Law, Note and Comment, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Legal
and Practical Issues Regarding Municipal Power to Address Federal Mandates, 50 IDAHO
L. REV. 27, 36 (2014) (defining environmental context of stormwater).
21. See Robert B. McKinstry Jr., et al., Unpave a Parking Lot and Put Up a Paradise: Using Green Infrastructure and Ecosystem Services to Achieve Cost-Effective Compliance, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,824, 10,826 (2012) (commenting on differing
stormwater management practices). The EPA limits pollutants emanating from
point sources with scientific-based maximums, which can be measured and verified. See id. It controls non-point source pollution with water quality standards.
See id.
22. For a further discussion of the history of regulation under the Cleanwater
Act and information on the effort to clean up the Chesapeake Bay, see Sections
II.A–C infra.
23. For a further discussion on background of federal and state stormwater
regulations, see Section II.A infra.
24. For a further discussion of federal and state relationship with agricultural
runoff, see Section II.B infra.
25. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s response to Chesapeake Bay
cleanup efforts, see Section II.C infra.
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2019) (defining “point source” as “any means of
discernable, confined, and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or
may be discharged.”); see also McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,824 n.4 (comparing
green and gray infrastructure). Green infrastructure incorporates green roofs,
swales, and permeable surfaces to increase soil infiltration and lower the volume of
water entering traditional storm sewers. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,824.
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opers to design with the existing legal framework and water infrastructure
in mind.27 Green infrastructure makes stormwater management more
cost effective in the long-term because it prevents stormwater from entering regulated storm sewers in the first place; water never discharged into
waterways is water that never pollutes.28 Increasingly, thanks to environmental regulations and budget crunches, big cities are incorporating
green infrastructure to take advantage of the ecosystem services nature
provides.29 Smaller municipalities, lacking access to initial funding for
capital improvements, have a harder time keeping up with their environmental obligations under the Clean Water Act.30
1.

The Clean Water Act

Congress enacted the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972.31 Initially a law intended to encourage voluntary best management practices
27. See CONSERVATION RESEARCH INST., CHANGING COST PERCEPTIONS: AN
ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATION DEVELOPMENT 2 (2005), http://www.auburnhills.org/
departments/community_development/low_impact_development/docs/
4__3F10D62B_F3D4_4FC9_97D8_35DB71D6CC4B_.pdf [https://perma.cc/284M9E55] (not accounting for cost of changing minds when price comparing conventional and low impact development). The municipal focus on upfront costs enables developers to choose conventional building materials such as concrete over
permeable pavers and furthers public opinion that conventional gray infrastructure is always more affordable. Id.; see also Green Infrastructure Cost-Benefit Resources,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2017), https://www.epa.gov/green-infrastructure/green-infrastructure-cost-benefit-resources#costanalysis [https://perma.cc/T2PK-YZR6]
(providing information on cost-benefit analysis methods). Straight cost comparisons analyze initial and lifecycle costs while cost-benefit analyses attempt to account for environmental and social outcomes of incorporating green
infrastructure. Id.
28. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,827 (recounting benefits of green infrastructure). Green infrastructure features also provide multiple environmental
benefits such as absorbing heat, absorbing water and air pollution, and increasing
a neighborhood’s overall aesthetic. See id.
29. See id. at 10,824 (describing implementation of green infrastructure).
Philadelphia and New York City use natural environmental services to clean and
filter municipal water as part of larger water management plans. See id. Philadelphia implemented a program in 2012 to reduce stormwater flow into its sewer
system that is expected to save the city $8 billion. See id.
30. See Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2, at 47–48 (statement of Jeffrey
Stonehill) (accounting municipality’s focus on repairing existing infrastructure).
The 2,533 inlets of Chambersburg’s “gray” storm sewer lead to 128 outfalls into the
adjacent river. See id. at 42. According to Jeffrey Stonehill, Borough Manager, the
borough’s gray infrastructure had been left untouched for a century because there
were no regulations or money to intervene. See id. at 54. Stonehill, who was speaking for the Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, said: “If we
don’t make these big improvements that the DEP has put on our permit we’re
going to get in big trouble. And we’ve seen other communities get in big trouble
. . . .” See id. at 58. Derry Township, which also imposed a stormwater user fee,
raises $1 million annually to repair aging infrastructure; to fully assess and manage
its stormwater runoff the township needs at least $27 million. See id. at 14.
31. See Summary of the Clean Water Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY [hereinafter CWA
Summary], https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act
[https://perma.cc/6G72-A8EY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (summarizing origin
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(BMPs), increased urbanization and ensuing stormwater pollution soon
drove the implementation of a new pollution control feature: stormwater
permitting.32 Stormwater permitting imposes maintenance measures and
outright bans on stormwater to reduce the pollution load in streams and
rivers.33 Only once a polluter successfully applies for a permit under the
NPDES can they discharge into waterways.34 Further, the CWA conditions
permit approvals on applicants using BMPs to reduce the amount of pollutants entering storm sewers in order to maintain or meet water quality
standards.35
The NPDES targets municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s)
because of the abundance of pollutants found in urban runoff.36
Stormwater contains pesticides, fertilizers, pet waste, and illicitly dumped
pollutants such as chlorinated water.37 MS4 operators must develop, apof Clean Water Act). The Clean Water Act is truly an amendment to the 1948
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See id.
32. See McKinstry, supra note 21, 10,826 (exploring history of Clean Water
Act); see also OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 833-F-00-001,
STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: AN OVERVIEW [hereinafter PHASE II], https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/fact1-0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TJ4T-K8D2] (last revised Dec. 2005) (explaining reason for second wave
of NPDES permitting in 2000).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1995) (decreeing pollutant discharge illegal unless in accordance with issued permit).
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i–(iii) (2018) (requiring discharging permittees to comply with EPA programs). NPDES general permits are distinguished
from industrial discharge permits because they are issued for “clearly described
category of point source discharges, when those discharges are substantially similar
in nature and do not have the potential to cause significant adverse environmental
impact.” 25 PA. CODE § 92a.2 (2010).
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(e) (2000) (authorizing EPA administrator to establish BMPs); see also 40 C.F.R. §122.4(d) (2019) (prohibiting issuance of a permit
unable to guarantee compliance with water quality standards of downstream
states); McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,826 (describing purpose of NPDES program); Kate Miller & Joshua Duke, Additionality and Water Quality Trading: Institutional Analysis of Nutrient Trading in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 25 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 533 (2013) (describing effectiveness of forested riparian barriers as BMPs). The EPA also establishes nationwide ambient water quality standards; streams not meeting those standards are considered “impaired” and are
written onto the CWA’s 303(d) list. See § 1314. NPDES permittees must commit
to, and provide regular updates on, reducing runoff pollution above. See id.
36. See PHASE II, supra note 32 (providing background on NPDES program).
The initial push to require stormwater permitting from point sources captured
“large” MS4s that served more than 100,000 people as well as construction sites
larger than five acres. See id. at 2. Phase II, revealed in 1999, encompassed all
MS4s located in urbanized areas regardless of population and construction sites
between one and five acres. See id. For further discussion of MS4s, see infra note
51 and accompanying text.
37. See Polluted Runoff, supra note 19 (explaining content and effect of polluted runoff). Untreated runoff travels fast enough to erode stream banks, pulling
sediment into the water in a volume that alters water composition enough to impair visibility. See id.
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ply, and enforce BMPs to reduce the amount of pollutants in the water “to
the maximum extent practicable.”38
The EPA authorizes qualifying states to administer the NPDES program on its behalf, requiring permittees to include national and local
water standards while saying little about how states should treat non-point
source pollution.39 The EPA approved forty-seven states based on their
program description.40 Pennsylvania is one of those states.41
2.

Stormwater Regulations in Pennsylvania

The DEP regulates stormwater through the Stormwater Management
Act and the Clean Streams Law.42 The Stormwater Management Act is
intended to preserve and restore streams through local stormwater management.43 The act created an environmental framework in which counties are charged with coordinating watershed management plans with
municipalities and the DEP.44 It also forced developers to build new
38. See PHASE II, supra note 32, at 3 (explaining BMPs). The Phase II program
relies heavily on MS4 operators doing public outreach and encouraging the public
to make personal changes to stormwater practices, but also listed “illicit discharge
detection” as a BMP. See id.
39. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,824 (discussing the EPA, Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, and City of Philadelphia’s consent
agreement to allow the city to use green infrastructure to limit uncontrolled
stormwater run-off); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2018) (authorizing
states to implement NPDES program); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.307 (discussing
Pennsylvania law on industrial waste).
40. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2018) (authorizing states to
implement NPDES program); see also 40 C.F.R. §123.22 (2019) (providing overview
of concentrated animal feeding operations under NPDES program); EPA, NPDES
State Program Information, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-state-program-information [https://perma.cc/9GRW-Z4QD] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019) (providing
overview of states with delegated NPDES authority).
41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1987) (recognizing state sovereignty over territorial
waters); see also The Clean Streams Law, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 691.1–692.1001
(1970) (banning water prohibiting discharge into the waters of the Commonwealth, directly or indirectly, without a permit authorized by the Department of
Environmental Protection).
42. See The Stormwater Management Act, 32 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 680.1–680.17
(1978) (detailing the statutory provision that controls stormwater management);
see also The Clean Streams Law, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 691.1–691.1001 (1970) (providing the statutory provision that disallows the discharge of stormwater without a
permit).
43. See 32 PA. CONS. STAT. §680.3 (1978) (setting purpose of Stormwater Management Act). Stormwater management was increasingly necessary as development upended natural environment, increasing the flow and velocity of runoff. See
id. § 680.2 (describing runoff problem). Trying for a gentle approach, the
Stormwater Management Act only set “reasonable regulation” of runoff-causing
developments. See id.
44. See id. § 680.5 (detailing tasks “reasonably necessary” to manage
stormwater in accord with other municipal, county, state, and regional environmental plans). Watershed management plans are built from assessments of current runoff, drainage problems, available control technology, and environmental
impacts. See id. § 680.5(b). The act also required counties to submit reports, con-
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properties in a way that did not increase the “quantity, velocity, or direction” of runoff.45
Pennsylvania also extended the CWA into state law through the Clean
Streams Law with the goal of eliminating pollution in every stream.46 By
all accounts this is a tough goal to meet: Pennsylvania houses some 85,000
miles of streams statewide, more than 11,000 miles of which are impaired
in the Chesapeake Bay watershed alone.47 Still, the Clean Streams Law
declared any effluent discharge able to pollute streams to be a public nuisance and authorized the DEP to create a “comprehensive program of watershed management and control.”48
The Clean Streams Law also implemented the NPDES under Pennsylvania’s control with the EPA’s blessing.49 Pennsylvania MS4s located in
“urbanized areas” or otherwise designated by the DEP must hold the
NPDES permits.50 If the MS4 discharges into impaired waters, it must implement pollution reduction plans “to the maximum extent possible”; but
duct stormwater surveys and educational program, but it did not create water quality standards. See id. § 680.14. Moreover, because of how expensive management
plans could be to study and implement, the DEP made grants available to cover
75% of the cost—on top of what any federal program could provide. See id.
§ 680.17 (explaining Stormwater Management Act funding).
45. See id. § 680.13 (applying stormwater regulations to developers). Following implementation, municipalities across the state had six months to change their
ordinances and implement the Stormwater Management Act into their review of
land use plans. See id.
46. See 35 PA. STAT. §§ 691.4, 691.401 (declaring water conservation policy);
see also 25 PA. CODE § 91.5 (describing state NPDES permitting process).
47. See 2018 INTEGRATED REPORT, supra note 13 (reviewing Pennsylvania water
management background information).
48. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.4 (1970) (defining policy underlying statute).
Pollution is the contamination of streams that makes water harmful or detrimental
to public health of’ legitimate uses, including contamination that changes water’s
smell, color, temperature, or visibility. See id. § 691.1.
49. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,826 (recounting history of NPDES).
50. See Notice of Qualifying Urban Areas for the 2010 Census, 77 FED. REG.
18,651 (Mar. 27, 2012) (describing how Census Bureau determines urbanized areas based on population density); see also 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification
and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-rural/2010-urban-rural.html
[https://perma.cc/KGU9-ZT5G] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (defining “urbanized
area” as population of 50,000 or more people); Urbanized Area Maps for NPDES MS4
Phase II Stormwater Permits, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/urbanized-area-maps-npdes-ms4-phase-ii-stormwater-permits [https://perma.cc/
MWW5-KEY7] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (explaining that “A ‘small MS4’ is any MS4
not already regulated under Phase I of the NPDES stormwater program” in 1999).
See generally Municipal Stormwater, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT. [hereinafter Municipal
Stormwater], https://www.dep.pa.gov:443/Business/Water/CleanWater/
StormwaterMgmt/Stormwater/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/WYL2JFQY] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) (summarizing state of municipal stormwater regulations). Pennsylvania identifies 2 “large” MS4s and 1,059 “small” MS4s. See Municipal Stormwater, supra.
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if the MS4 lies within the Chesapeake Bay watershed it must submit a more
rigorous TMDL plan.51
B.

High on the Hog: Agriculture’s Rich History of Federal Funding

Although the idea of American farmland conjures to mind idyllic pastures, the true picture of modern agriculture is often sobering.52 While
most farms are indeed run by families, only 43% of those farms earn more
than $10,000 in gross income.53 The agricultural industry relies heavily on
federal support in the form of loans, insurance programs, research
projects, and regulatory exemptions.54 Most agricultural wealth is concentrated in 77% of agricultural producers, who own most of the cropland,
receive half of the federal government’s support, and receive 90% of the
industry’s income.55 In total, the federal government gives approximately
$3 billion annually to farmers, little of which is dedicated to conservation
measures.56
1.

“Big Ag” as Point Source Polluters Under the NPDES

The Clean Water Act encompasses the NPDES program, which focuses on regulating animal-producing operations.57 The program focuses
on operations that confine animals to feed lots for significant periods of
time.58 Crowded living conditions in those animal feed operations are
fresh fodder for EPA regulation because they compact the soil and con51. See Municipal Stormwater, supra note 50 (explaining pollution reduction requirements in Pennsylvania); see also Unkovic, supra note 19 (commenting on how
DEP regulations function).
52. See Peter Lehner & Nathan Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-Neutral
Agriculture, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,845, 10,855 (2017) (describing livestock waste
management).
53. See Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,867 (noting statistics of agricultural
industry).
54. See id. at 10,858 (describing relationship of agricultural industry to federal
government).
55. See id. at 10,870 (examining regulatory approaches in light of farm size).
The USDA’s mission includes preserving natural resources for farming, necessarily
entailing the use of some conservation practices to prevent the industry from
shooting itself in the foot. See id. at 10,859.
56. See id. at 10,858 (discussing federal aid programs).
57. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a)–(g) (2019) (detailing which discharges are not
subject to NPDES permits); see also 25 PA. CODE § 92a.5 (2019) (detailing further
prohibitions for the state NPDES program); Klopman, supra note 8, at 110. Federal and state NPDES programs exempt agricultural runoff from orchards, row
crops, and pastureland from permitting requirements because the water does not
enter streams from an identifiable culvert or pipe that could be measured. See 40
C.F.R. § 122.3(a)–(g) (2019); see also 25 PA. CODE § 92a.5.
58. See Animal Feeding Operations, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/animal-feeding-operations-afos [https://perma.cc/
S6GH-ZK39] (providing criteria for NPDES permitting).
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centrate manure so it cannot naturally be reintegrated with the soil.59 As
manure builds up, heavy rains and manure management failure release
waste into surface waters, leading to nutrient pollution downstream.60
Once an animal feed operation’s size passes the federal threshold and
it discharges runoff through man-made culverts, its risk to surface waters
triggers government intervention.61 The federal government categorizes
the operation as a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO).62
NPDES permits regulate America’s 20,000 CAFOs, which produce most of
the country’s food-producing animals and pollution.63 CAFOs must implement conservation plans, including nutrient management plans, to obtain an NPDES permit.64
2.

Manure Management in Pennsylvania

Agricultural operations generate significant nitrogen-rich manure
spread over cropland in unnecessarily large amounts.65 Half of the nitrogen in fertilizer stays in the soil where it can be carried away by water
59. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 820-R-13-002, LITERATURE REVIEW OF LIVEPOULTRY MEASURES 1 (2013) [hereinafter EPA, LITERATURE REVIEW]
(critiquing concentrated livestock farming). According to one USDA Economic
Research Services study, 60% of nitrogen and 70% of phosphorus from manure
cannot be incorporated into the soil where it was excreted. See id. at v.
60. See id. at 1 (“Runoff related to manure is considered a primary contributor
to widespread nutrient water quality pollution in the U.S. . . . .”). Excess nutrients
in water lead to eutrophication, which is evidenced by blue-green blooms of algae
that create low oxygen zones called “dead zones” and are toxic to both animals and
humans. See id. at 48.
61. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(6) (2019) (listing animal threshold to be considered a CAFO). In some cases, animal feed operations that do not meet the EPA’s
size requirement are regulated as “small CAFOs” because the operation itself or its
location near surface waters makes it “a significant contributor of pollutants.” See
id. § 122.23(c).
62. See id. To be considered a CAFO, any animal operation must reach a
certain size and either discharge runoff through a manmade structure or allow
runoff to pass through the area where animals are located. See id.
63. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2019) (setting framework for CAFO permitting);
see also Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,855 (describing pollution from factory farms);
Klopman, supra note 8, at 98–99 (commenting on EPA finding farms to be Bay’s
largest pollution source).
64. See EPA, LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 59, at 71 (explaining nutrient
management measures). Nutrient plans describe to government inspectors what
tools the operation is using (i.e., surface storage tanks for liquid manure or diverting rainfall around pens) to prevent polluted runoff. See id. at 72; see also 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.42(c)(1) (2019) (regulating municipal annual reports).
65. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(4), (6) (2019) (defining CAFOs); see also Lehner,
supra note 52, at 10,849 (critiquing over-application of nitrogen fertilizer). Perhaps in a mistaken belief that more fertilizer will result in a higher yield, farmers
over apply fertilizer, sometimes up to 40% more than what was captured by plants
during the previous growing season. Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,849. In 2011,
farmers applied 12,840,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer to cropland. See id. at 10,869
n.303.
STOCK AND
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runoff as nitrate.66 Application techniques and timing contribute to nutrient pollution.67
Pennsylvania farms rank exceptionally high in both concentration of
manure per acre and the use of manure as an organic fertilizer.68 While
synthetic fertilizers account for more nutrient application nationwide, in
Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna River, most of the nutrient pollution comes
from animal manure.69 Moreover, the land draining to the Susquehanna
is dotted with thousands of farms too small to be regulated by Pennsylvania’s NPDES program.70
C.

Catastrophe in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed

Chesapeake Bay cleanup efforts have a long but unsuccessful career.71 One of the oldest efforts is the Chesapeake Bay Program, which
began in 1983 and subsequently led to a 1987 agreement among several
states in the watershed to cut nitrogen and phosphorous levels 40% by
2000.72 Despite federal interest and grants, the 2000 deadline passed with
nitrogen and phosphorus levels reduced by only 13% and 25%, respectively.73 Undeterred, member states changed tactics in 2000 and focused
instead on working with local communities to develop watershed remediation plans to remove the Bay from the CWA’s impaired waters list within
the decade.74
In 2009, the Bay and many of its watershed streams were impaired
thanks to an annual 282 million pounds of nitrogen.75 Three states—Ma66. See Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,845, 10,84–49 (describing chemical composition of pollutants). Manure not integrated into the soil also releases into the
air as nitrous oxide, a source of air pollution. See id.
67. See id. at 10,849 (stating that the “[B]est practices for fertilization include
reducing the rate of application [and] . . . improving the timing.”).
68. See EPA, LITERATURE REVIEW, supra note 59, at 5 (comparing Pennsylvania
farms to manure production in other states). Pennsylvania farms produced 2.99
tons of manure per acre of farmland in 2007. See id.
69. See id. at 47 (“Nationwide, 45% of nitrogen and 79% of phosphorus inputs
to cropland may be attributed to synthetic fertilizers.”). Organic fertilizers account
for more nutrient pollution in certain watersheds. See id. at 47–48.
70. See 25 PA. CODE § 92a.29 (setting limits to NPDES permitting).
71. See Klopman, supra note 8, at 98 (chronicling Chesapeake Bay cleanup
efforts). Despite its being a vital natural resource, efforts to clean the Chesapeake
Bay reaching back to the 1960s have not cleaned up the water. See id.
72. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,214 (detailing historic attempts to clean the
Chesapeake Bay). In 1987, Congress created the Chesapeake Bay Program from
those member states; it simultaneously authorized the EPA to advise members and
to extend grants toward Bay restoration. See id.
73. See id. (recounting Pennsylvania’s failure to meet 2010 pollution reduction goals).
74. See id. (explaining 2000 Chesapeake Bay Agreement).
75. See Chesapeake Bay Watershed Pollution Limits, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND.,
https://www.cbf.org/how-we-save-the-bay/chesapeake-clean-water-blueprint/pollution-limits/index.html [https://perma.cc/59DG-8V3M] (last visited Sept. 30,
2019) (comparing pollution reduction milestones). In 2009, the Bay also saw
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ryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—accounted for nearly 90% of the nitrogen and phosphorus flowing into the Bay.76 The problem was
boundless; only 20% of the total pollution load was tied to existing point
sources.77 The 2000 plan failed, and after years of ineffectual cleanup efforts the EPA realized it needed to do more.78
1.

The TMDL: Reaping What Was Sowed

Spurred on by thirty years of failed restoration efforts, a lawsuit, and
an executive order from President Obama, the EPA established a phased
TMDL across the entire Chesapeake Bay in 2010.79 The TMDL effectively
put the Chesapeake Bay on a “pollution diet,” restricting the total amount
of pollution it could accept.80 The EPA announced that any state not
meeting the pollution limitations would invite stronger oversight and expanded regulations.81 As part of the diet’s first phase, the EPA ordered
19.23 million pounds of phosphorous and 8.68 billion pounds of sediment annually. See id.
76. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,222 (describing Bay pollution status as of
2010).
77. See id. at 10,223–24 (explaining state of water pollution regulation). In
2009, the EPA’s “weak financial leverage” over non-point sources, which created
the bulk of the Bay’s pollution load and are frequently exempted from regulations,
led the agency to create an accountability framework for the Bay out of existing
control mechanisms and threaten to actually use them against a broader scope of
pollutant sources than it had previously. Id. at 10,212, 10,217–18.
78. See id. at 10,215 (describing end result of 2000 Chesapeake Bay Agreement). Chesapeake Bay Program members recognized a need for stronger regulations on agriculture by 2010. See id. Overall, water quality nationwide worsened
during 1998–2008; the number of impaired U.S. streams rose from 291,000 to
463,000. See id. at 10,211; see also Klopman, supra note 8, at 98 (introducing the
2010 TMDL).
79. See Exec. Order No. 13508, 74 Fed. Reg. § 23,099 (May. 15, 2009), https:/
/www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/05/11/2010-11143/executive-order13508-chesapeake-bay-protection-and-restoration-section-203-final-coordinated
[https://perma.cc/T9QV-SUYR] (ordering protection and restoration of the
Chesapeake Bay); see also CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 2014 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT 1 (2017) [hereinafter 2014 AGREEMENT], https://www.chesapeakebay.net/
documents/FINAL_Ches_Bay_Watershed_Agreement.withsignatures-HIres.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YKH-A4ZH] (describing TMDL program). TMDL programs
monitor and target non-point source pollution, which cannot be captured through
the NPDES permitting program, by enforcing ambient water quality standards. See
Houck, supra note 5, at 10,209 (describing function of TMDL). A TMDL identifies
a polluted waterway, sets a threshold pollution standard in which the waterway can
still maintain aquatic life, and works backward to enforce the limit without discriminating between pollution sources. See id. TMDLs are not rare, but the Chesapeake Bay TMDL, imposed in 2010, is the most ambitious and complex to date.
See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303 (M.D. Pa. 2013)
(counting 730 meetings over five years to develop TMDL).
80. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,209–10 (setting stage for TMDL’s impact).
81. See Klopman, supra note 8, at 105–06 (describing stronger measures).
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states within the watershed to draft “enforceable and binding” blueprints
for how they planned to reach their water quality goals.82
State governments responded by September 2010 with Phase I Watershed Implementation Plans (WIPs) that were inadequate, lacking sufficient detail on how to implement, monitor, and fund reductions.83 In
particular, Pennsylvania’s plan increased pressure on point source polluters instead of creating new requirements for non-point sources.84
When the plan finally did turn to non-point sources, it was with hopes they
would voluntarily reduce pollution.85
The EPA offered guidance on what it was looking for, but even so
Pennsylvania’s final Phase I WIP was little better.86 Pennsylvania’s WIP
now called for increased local government involvement in water regulations but provided few details on what that meant in practice.87 Dissatisfied, the EPA put its own requirements in place that were stricter than
anything Pennsylvania’s Phase I WIP proposed.88
2.

Phase II: Reduce, Reassure, Revise

If the EPA had high hopes for Pennsylvania in Phase II, those hopes
were again disappointed.89 Beginning in 2012 with the release of Phase II
82. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,217 (detailing the standard for WIPs). State
WIPs had to give “reasonable assurances” that necessary reductions were happening through descriptions, measures, and by listing who the state’s responsible parties were. See id.; see also Klopman, supra note 8, at 97–98 (introducing TMDLs).
83. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,221 (introducing Phase I WIPs); Klopman,
supra note 8, at 106 (asserting states over relied on voluntary pollution reduction
by non-point sources).
84. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL, 8–9 to –10 (2010)
[hereinafter EPA TMDL Section 8], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2014-12/documents/cbay_final_tmdl_section_8_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WUW9-NNU3] (discussing backstop adjustments). The EPA considered Pennsylvania’s focus on urban stormwater lacking and wrote backstop adjustments into
the TMDL based on the state’s final Phase I WIP. See id.; see also Houck, supra note
5, at 10,222 (discussing regulatory impact on MS4s versus non-point source
polluters).
85. See Houck, supra note 5, at 10,222 (commenting on voluntary measures
guiding non-point source agricultural regulations).
86. See Klopman, supra note 8, at 106 (“[S]tates were unwilling to confront
one of the prime sources of pollution: agriculture.”).
87. See id. at 106–07 (discussing Phase I WIPs).
88. See EPA TMDL Section 8, supra note 84, at 8–9 (opening more urban
stormwater to regulation as point-source pollution). Fifty percent of the urban
stormwater load was readjusted to be point source pollution, subjecting more urbanized areas to increased and expansive NPDES permitting requirements. See id.
at 8–26.
89. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., EPA EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S
2016–2017 AND 2018–2019 MILESTONES 1 (2018) [hereinafter EPA EVALUATION],
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/ChesapeakeBayOffice/TrackProgress/
EPA_Final_Evaluation_of_Pennsylvania_2016-2017_and_2018-2019_Milestones.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PTK-K9XL] (describing the unachieved goals of Phase II).
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plans, Pennsylvania—the key player in Bay restoration—struggled.90
When Pennsylvania failed to meet its 2015 milestone goals for nitrogen
and sediment reduction in both agricultural and stormwater sectors, the
EPA stripped the state of $2,896,723 in Chesapeake Bay funding.91
Until that point, the DEP had been spending $127.6 million annually
to deploy BMPs across the state.92 Now it had reoriented toward providing technical assistance and identifying agricultural BMPs put into place
without government assistance.93 It also pushed for upcoming MS4
NPDES permits to condition DEP approval on municipalities reducing
pollution outflows by a set percentage.94
Despite laying out an ambitious plan to meet the 2017 reduction target of 60% of the state’s TMDL reductions, Pennsylvania’s missed mark
90. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DECEMBER 2014 STATUS REPORT ON PA
2014–2015 PROGRAMMATIC MILESTONE [hereinafter DEP, DECEMBER STATUS],
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/ChesapeakeBayOffice/TrackProgress/PA20142015ProgrammaticMilestonesSTATUSREPORT1-13-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
46XW-VJQU] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018) (recording DEP progress through 2014).
The 2014 Status Report showed the DEP understaffed and falling behind in its
nutrient oversight, educational outreach, and surveying of farms. See id. at 2–4; see
also Heidi Reed, Pa. Farmers Working to Improve Health of Chesapeake Bay, HERALD
MAIL MEDIA (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.heraldmailmedia.com/news/farm_
news/pa-farmers-working-to-improve-health-of-chesapeake-bay/article_d41578b915de-5868-9a0f-2ff6acc84ae8.html [https://perma.cc/SL3G-6QFN] (giving background context to impending Phase III requirements).
91. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., A DEP STRATEGY TO ENHANCE PENNSYLVANIA’S CHESAPEAKE BAY RESTORATION EFFORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter PA. DEP,
STRATEGY] http://www.dep.state.pa.us/river/iwo/chesbay/docs/DEPChesapeake
BayRestorationStrategy012116.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLY2-JB4N] (comparing
success in wastewater plants to failures in stormwater sewers and farms). The EPA
conditioned the future receipt of funds on increasing and targeting state funding
toward high-need farms, proving the state’s commitment to a “culture of compliance,” and commit to inspecting 10% of farms within the watershed. See id. at 19.
The EPA also threatened to expand the NPDES permitting program to previously
waived municipalities and take control of permits that did not conform to the
TMDL. See id. at 20–21.
92. See id. at 6 (calculating government contribution to farm BMPs). The government contributed $42,000–$45,000 to each farm in its grant program to build
and implement BMPs such as manure management systems. See id. In the same
time, it offered municipalities $25,000–$50,000 grants—conditioned on availability
of funding—to study the feasibility of self-creating a water authority or stormwater
fee to fund their reduction requirements. See id. at 11.
93. See id. at 9–10 (noting reliable strategies to maximize resources).
94. See id. at 10 (“There is a need to re-evaluate the Chesapeake Bay Phase 2
WIP for achieving reductions from the urban sector and the reduction allocations
for this sector.”). At a minimum, the pollution reduction plan accompanying each
municipality’s general MS4 permit application must cover a plan to reduce sediment, nitrogen, and phosphorus by 10%, 5%, and 3%, respectively, over the five
year life of the permit. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., AUTHORIZATION TO DISCHARGE 3800-PM-BCW0100D, at 29 (2016), http://www.depgreenport.state.pa.us/
elibrary/GetDocument?docId=11134&DocName=04%20SAMPLE%20APPROVAL%20OF%20COVERAGE%20AND%20MS4%20GENERAL%20PERMIT
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y79-QQSH] (discussing the pollution reduction plan).
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still stymied Bay restoration efforts.95 In the years prior to 2017, when all
Bay jurisdictions were due to reach 60% of the TMDL reduction goal, the
Bay fell short.96 Just 42% of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries met
TMDL water quality standards.97
III. SWIMMING

SHADOW OF GIANTS: PENNSYLVANIA
REACTS TO THE TMDL

IN THE

Pennsylvania’s 2016 Bay restoration strategy strained municipalities
and promised increased agricultural oversight while the DEP drafted the
Commonwealth’s Phase III WIP.98 The heightened NPDES requirements
for MS4s created risks for local governments by hinging state compliance
with a fast-approaching deadline on slow-moving and legally risky
stormwater charges.99 Pennsylvania’s five state programs focused on agricultural environmental conservation and promised big results, but had little payoff.100 Finally, Pennsylvania’s much-anticipated Draft Phase III
WIP, which was released in August 2019, promised “reasonable assurances” of compliance despite a history of underfunding and under-monitoring of agricultural initiatives.101
A.

Low-Hanging Fruit: Point Source Regulation of MS4s

Pennsylvania understands water pollution first as a statewide problem
of water quality.102 The Chesapeake Bay TMDL, covering 350 regulated
95. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S 2016–2017 AND
2018–2019 MILESTONES 1 (2018), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/Chesapeake
BayOffice/TrackProgress/EPA_Final_Evaluation_of_Pennsylvania_2016-2017_
and_2018-2019_Milestones.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU44-TRRC] (critiquing Pennsylvania’s TMDL performance). Several river basins within the Bay watershed met
either phosphorous or nitrogen goals, but no river basin was able to meet the 2017
target for sediment reductions. See id.; see also DEP STRATEGY, supra note 91 (announcing Pennsylvania’s new plan to tackle Bay pollution underperformance).
96. See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 2017–2018 BAY BAROMETER 1, 11 (2018),
https://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/2017-2018_Bay_Barometer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LC45-2EQN] (showing total percentage nitrogen reduction).
The Bay fell short of its 60% nitrogen reduction goal and was 15 million pounds
above the TMDL cutoff. See id.
97. See id. at 12 (detailing water quality standards). In 2017, 240 million
pounds of nitrogen, 12.7 million pounds of phosphorus, and 4.3 million pounds of
sediment entered the Chesapeake Bay. Id.
98. See PA. DEP, STRATEGY, supra note 91 (outlining Commonwealth’s strategy
to reach TMDL levels). One of the DEP’s strategies was giving MS4s a bigger piece
of phosphorus reductions to alleviate the burden from agriculture sources. See id.
at 27.
99. For a further discussion of legal risks in raising storms water, see infra
notes 102–45 and accompanying text.
100. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania’s slow response to agricultural
runoff compliance, see Section III.C.
101. For a further discussion on mixed feedback to Pennsylvania’s Phase III
WIP, see Section III.C infra.
102. See Pennsylvania’s Chesapeake Bay Plan, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://
www.dep.pa.gov:443/Business/Water/Pennsylvania%E2%80%99s%20Chesapeake
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municipalities and 11,000 miles of impaired streams across the center of
the state, is merely an additional layer of regulation.103 So when the percentage pollution reduction for MS4 communities developed in the DEP’s
2016 Bay Restoration Strategy hit, the shockwaves went out statewide.104
Municipalities in the watershed felt the biggest impact: NPDES permit
renewals now had to include a TMDL plan to reduce nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment by 10%, 5%, and 3% respectively.105 Outside the
watershed, MS4s discharging into impaired streams also had to develop
pollution reduction plans, albeit at different reduction amounts.106 Two
key aspects of plan development included mapping the municipality’s en%20Bay%20Program%20Office/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/QN787Z3D] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (explaining importance of focusing on local
water quality). Local water quality improvements are required pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law and the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id.; see also
Majority of Conservation Districts in Bay Watershed Agree to Work with DEP to Reduce
Runoff, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT.: DEP NEWSROOM (2016), http://www.ahs.dep.pa
.gov/NewsRoomPublic/articleviewer.aspx?id=21065&typeid=1 [https://perma.cc/
23ZT-U8HZ] (“Reducing farm runoff is key to restoring water quality both locally
in Pennsylvania and in the Bay . . . .”).
103. See DEP, DECEMBER STATUS, supra note 90 (quantifying level of pollution
in Chesapeake Bay watershed). Since the website’s last update, water pollution in
watershed rivers has increased somewhat; Pennsylvania’s Phase III WIP noted
15,369 miles of “impaired” streams. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., CHESAPEAKE
BAY OFFICE PENNSYLVANIA PHASE 3 CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN (2019) [hereinafter FINAL PHASE III], http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/
ChesapeakeBayOffice/WIPIII/FinalPlan/PA_Phase_3_WIP_Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CX35-3GPP] (laying out Pennsylvania’s plan to meet 2025 TMDL goals
within seven years).
104. See PRP/TMDL Plans, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://www.dep.pa.gov/
Business/Water/CleanWater/StormwaterMgmt/Stormwater/Pages/PRPTMDLPlans.aspx [https://perma.cc/R295-Y4GS] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019) (providing
information for TMDL and pollution reduction plans); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT.,
PA GENERAL NPDES PERMIT 3800-PM-BCW0100D (2016) (setting out purposes of
TMDL and pollution reduction plans); see also Unkovic, supra note 19 (noting discharges into high quality water face different oversight than those into impaired
waters). For a further discussion of Pennsylvania resident’s reactions to
stormwater fees and other measures to reduce pollution, see infra notes 181–82
and accompanying text.
105. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PA GENERAL NPDES PERMIT 3800-PMBCW0100D (2016) (describing pollution reduction requirements for Chesapeake
Bay watershed discharges). To discharge into the Chesapeake Bay, MS4s must submit approved plans and put them into place over a five-year timescale. See id.
MS4s also have to submit annual progress reports to the DEP. See id. at 29.
106. See id. at 30 (noting pollution reduction requirements for impaired
streams not in watershed). Pollution reduction plans for non-Bay discharge into
impaired streams face a 10% sediment reduction and total pollution reductions of
5% over the course of the five-year permit. See id. The difference in requirements
does not make life easier for MS4 communities, who still face increased compliance costs on tight budgets. See generally Kurt Bresswein, New Stormwater Fee to Cost
Easton Residents $75–80 a Year, LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE.COM (Aug. 23, 2018), https://
www.lehighvalleylive.com/easton/2018/08/new_stormwater_fee_to_cost_eas.html
[https://perma.cc/34SZ-HND5] (discussing fee implemented to fund 30.5 ton reduction in runoff sediment).
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tire stormwater system from inflow to river and identifying BMPs such as
green infrastructure.107
Local municipalities implementing federally mandated stormwater
improvements saw red, not green.108 The high cost of complying with
these mandates caused tension in local governments.109 With money tied
up in ballooning pension and healthcare costs, municipalities found it difficult to manage the additional cost without burning through slim budget
surpluses or generating new revenue.110 The solution to these problems
was not innovative—it was fees.111
1.

Looking for Funding in All the Wrong Places

Infrastructure is financed by grants, bonds, fees, and taxes, but Pennsylvania municipalities face legal and practical limitations on how they can
raise money.112 Grants are in short supply, and bonds require taking out
debt that has to be paid back one way or another.113
Meeting TMDL water quality standards before 2025 may well require
municipalities to seek initial financing on their infrastructure projects.114
A common option for initial funding on big infrastructure projects is issu107. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,824 (comparing traditional and
“green” sewer systems); Rosenbloom, supra note 19, at 322 (criticizing ability of
gray infrastructure to respond to extreme weather events). Because gray infrastructure is a system of cisterns connected by fixed-size pipes, it cannot adapt to
accommodate sudden rain events like environmental-based systems do. See Rosenbloom, supra note 19, at 321–22. Scholars, experts, and advocates focus on the
benefits of replacing “gray infrastructure”—traditional stormwater sewer systems—
with “green infrastructure” that replicates natural water infiltration. See id.
108. See Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2, at 60 (statement of Mayor Sherry
Capello, Pennsylvania Municipal League).
109. See Law, supra note 20, at 40 (explaining impacts of federal mandates).
110. See Stephen Eide, Defeating Fiscal Distress: A State Responsibility, CIVIC REPORT, July 2013, at 1–2 [hereinafter Eide, Fiscal Distress] (describing expense challenges of local governments). In many cities, funds raised by taxes are insufficient
to cover growing expenses. City Fiscal Conditions 2018, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (Sept.
10, 2018), nlc.org/resource/city-fiscal-conditions-2018 [https://perma.cc/48AF9NPE] (surveying cities financial well-being).
111. See City Fiscal Conditions 2018, supra note 110 (critiquing municipalities
for being hind-sighted).
112. See James Salzman et al., The Most Important Current Research Questions in
Urban Ecosystem Services, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 24 (2014) (providing overview of green infrastructure funding); McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,835–36 (discussing financing structure and authorization of green infrastructure programs);
see also 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5607 (powers of municipal authorities include issuing
bonds and implementing fees).
113. See Jonathan Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV
657, 673 (2013) [hereinafter Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation] (noting risk investor’s take investing in municipal bonds); Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits
on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U.L. REV. 292, 316
(2018) [hereinafter Scharff, Powerful Cities] (noting that states are providing fewer
grants to municipalities).
114. See Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing Externalities
Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168, 174–75 (2018) [hereinafter Scharff, Green
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ing bonds, which are loans issued by the government at a fixed interest
rate for an agreed upon length of time.115 Relying on bond debt increases
the chance of a municipality falling into fiscal distress because municipalities are required to repay them regardless of whether the capital improvement generates the anticipated revenue, or, as in the case of green
infrastructure, sufficiently reduces costs.116 For small municipalities in
Pennsylvania’s heartland already burdened by higher-than-average poverty
levels, an aging population living on fixed incomes, and population decline, bonds may be an untenable alternative to implementing fees.117
That leaves fees and taxes.
Fees are charges that residents pay for services the municipality provides.118 Fees recoup the cost a municipality spends providing the service,
and the money is held in a separate account than general funds.119 Fees
offer municipalities near unlimited power—so long as the fee only reimburses expenses, a municipality has no limit to the money it can raise.120
For example, trash collection is a service frequently provided by municipalities so that each resident does not have to independently contract with
a waste hauler.121 A monthly or quarterly bill from the resident’s municipality for trash collection is considered a fee because each resident is specially benefited and can choose whether or not to receive the service.122
Taxes, applied across the board, are funds the municipality raises to
provide public services regardless of whether those services are used by an
individual.123 For example, residents might pay a local services tax to support emergency services regardless of whether any given resident will ever
need to call the fire department. Local governments do not have the
Fees] (discussing the nature of fees); see also Salzman, supra note 112, at 25–26
(discussing the importance of upfront financing).
115. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5602, 5608 (defining and authorizing municipal authorities to issue bonds).
116. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 299–30 (describing the roles
of municipal governments); Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, supra note 113, at
673 (describing financing concerns of municipal bonds). Bonds are risky business
because municipalities become obligated to repay them regardless of whether a
capital improvement generates the anticipated fee revenue. See id. at 673. Despite
being the primary way large municipalities fund ecosystem services, the law limits
the use of tax-exempt bonds for projects on private property. See Salzman, supra
note 112, at 28. Sometimes the money is limited by project—bonds may be available for construction but not maintenance costs. See id. at 29.
117. For a further discussion of the strain of state-imposed stormwater regulations, see Part V infra.
118. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 304 (defining fees).
119. See id. (defining user fees).
120. See id. (highlighting greater freedom municipalities enjoy over fees than
taxes).
121. See Law, supra note 20, at 35 (analogizing stormwater charges to garbage
fees).
122. See id. (explaining premise behind garbage fees); Scharff, Powerful Cities,
supra note 113, at 304–06 (explaining features of fees).
123. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 304 (defining taxes).
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power to tax unless provided to them by the state, and Pennsylvania’s Local Tax Enabling Act limits the scope and caps taxes that local governments can implement.124
Pennsylvania home rule law creates an exception to traditional funding limits, giving other municipalities more discretion to use all power except that forbidden by state constitution or the legislature.125
Municipalities that incorporate under a home rule charter can structure
their own governments, set employment policies, and raise revenue
through taxes or borrowing without being specifically authorized to do so
by state law.126 Although a home rule charter cannot increase or decrease
power already granted by the general assembly for the municipal class—it
cannot fix subjects and rates of taxation—powers explicitly granted are
interpreted in favor of the municipality.127 Some municipalities with
home rule charters implement stormwater fees.128
The Municipal Authorities Act allows municipalities to enter into
multi-municipality authorities for limited projects and services such as
managing stormwater infrastructure.129 Municipal authorities are afforded wide discretion in how their services are operated and can collect
fee-generated revenue on a town’s behalf, but they cannot raise taxes.130
Fees must be “reasonable and uniform” and geared specifically toward cov124. See Local Tax Enabling Act, 53 PA. STAT. § 6924.301.1 (2014) (explicitly
authorizing local tax authority for general revenue purposes, property transfers,
business privilege, and local services). The Local Tax Enabling Act covers second
and third class cities; towns; boroughs; and first and second class townships. Id. It
allows these municipalities to create taxes on real property, business privilege, local services, and for “general revenue purposes.” Id. It also limits the rates of
specific taxes. § 6924.311; see also Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 301
(introducing history of local governments lacking independent authority).
125. See PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (adopting process of home rule charters); 53
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2902 (listing powers of home rule municipalities); see also
Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 301–02 (explaining home rule charters).
Home rule arose out of the rapid industrialization of cities that needed to respond
faster and more flexibly to growing citizen concerns than the state could keep up
with. See id.
126. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 302–03 (listing home rule
municipality powers).
127. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2961, 2962(a) (1996) (describing the limited
powers of a home rule charter).
128. See STORMWATER FEES: OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL STORMWATER FEE PROGRAMS, PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL COMMISSION 7 (2017), https://pecpa.org/
wp-content/uploads/Stormwater-Utility-Fee-Booklet_Revamp_March17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EY6S-9P7L] (summarizing legal status of Pennsylvania
stormwater fees).
129. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5602, 5608 (2001).
130. See id. § 5607(d)(9) (authorizing multi-municipality authorities to “fix,
alter, charge and collect rates”); PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IN PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2015),
https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in-pennsylvania/
?wpdmdl=57758&ind=0 [https://perma.cc/FF55-8JH4] (explaining benefits of
creating municipal authorities); McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,835–37 (describing
Municipal Authorities Act).
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ering the authority’s operation, construction, repair, and maintenance
costs.131
While the general trend is for municipalities to have authority over
fees (after all, residents ostensibly opted into the MS4 services and can
“opt out” by making on-site stormwater improvements), in Pennsylvania,
only second class townships132 and municipalities with home rule charters
are permitted to directly implement user fees to cover their stormwater
expenses.133 Although local governments and residents prefer user fees
for their direct and efficient nature, there are other difficulties to consider.134 Fees are better suited to keeping up with maintenance costs and
paying loan interest than as upfront payments of new infrastructure features.135 In using only fees, cities are hard-pressed to generate enough
money to actually cover infrastructure repairs within the time given by
state and federal agencies.136 Larger repairs are costly and demand fees
larger than the public will tolerate.137 Municipalities are also hesitant to
create large fees because charges must be viewed as regulatory tools, not
money-generating tax levies.138 Meanwhile, pollution-reduction deadlines
can pass while revenue trickles in from fees.139

131. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5607(d) (2017) (listing powers of municipal
authorities).
132. See Second Class Township Code, 53 PA. STAT. § 65,201 (1995) (defining
second class townships as municipalities not governed by home rule charters and
having fewer than fewer than 300 residents per square mile).
133. See 53 PA CONS. STAT. § 67705; H.B. 473–474, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2019); see also McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,834 (discussing municipal
authority to implement fees); Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 292 (explaining municipal power distribution). Chambersburg, Pennsylvania is one borough that was able to self-impose a stormwater fee. See Stormwater Hearing, supra
note 2, at 39–40 (testifying about difficulties affording stormwater improvements).
Chambersburg considered it more appropriate for the council to set and collect
the fee directly because they were on “the frontline” handling business owners and
homeowners. Id. at 40.
134. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 174–75 (discussing nature of
fees). Residents prefer user fees because they have a limited scope, which holds
the government more accountable for its spending. See id. Governments prefer
fees because they are easier to raise and can be implemented in fewer steps. See id.
135. See Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, supra note 113, at 671–72 (criticizing fees as slow-accumulating source of funding).
136. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,835 (municipalities must ensure water
systems charge enough to cover costs).
137. See id. (commenting on difficulties in implementing fees and taxes to
cover compliance costs).
138. See Law, supra note 20, at 47 (explaining user fee’s nexus requirement).
A fee can still be considered a tax if the relationship between the fee and its stated
purpose is unclear. See id. at 32.
139. See Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, supra note 113, at 671–72 (explaining fees do not accumulate revenue quickly enough to fund large capital
purchases).
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A Fee by Any Other Name

MS4 communities across Pennsylvania began funding stronger federal regulations by implementing stormwater charges.140 But this puts local governments in a bind because the difference between a fee and a tax
is fact-specific enough to make it ripe grounds for litigation.141 Calling a
stormwater charge a fee rather than a tax does not make it so.142 The
distinction is grounded in the charge’s purpose.143
In a licensing context, Pennsylvania’s definition of a fee’s purpose is
based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s four-factor test in its 1953 decision, National Biscuit Company v. Philadelphia.144 A license fee is characterized by its being tailored to the type of business being regulated,
oversight and regulation by an authority, the business’ continued operation being conditioned on paying the fee, and the charge’s purpose of
reimbursing the agency for regulatory oversight expenses.145 Later, when
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania established Pennsylvania’s
modern tax-fee framework in White v. Commonwealth, Medical Professional
Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund,146 it acknowledged the contested charge did
140. See Salzman, supra note 112, at 31 (describing uses of fees). Large scale
projects are paid up front by bonds and use fees to pay for debt service, but smaller
MS4s use the fees to directly fund improvement projects. See id.
141. See Borough of West Chester v. Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 260
M.D. 2018, 2019 WL 30696422 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 15, 2019) (demurrer premature when law uncertain as to whether stormwater charge is tax or fee); Scharff,
Green Fees, supra note 114, at 171 (noting gray area between fees and taxes). The
difference between recouping direct costs of stormwater regulations and a more
general tax is determined by whether one considers rain gardens, repaving, and
riverbank reinforcement truly relating to improving water quality standards. See id.
Courts have allowed some user fees by twisting definitions and carving out exceptions, rendering the legal status of user fees an unpredictable, fact specific inquiry.
See id. at 178.
142. See White v. Commonwealth, Med. Profl. Liab. Catastrophe Loss Fund,
571 A.2d 9, 11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (noting charges are categorized based on
their purpose, not their name). In fact, the most basic factor test to determine
whether a charge is a fee or tax looks at a single characteristic such as purpose or
how funds will be spent. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 186 (discussing
characterization of charges). Mileage may vary by state; South Dakota, for example, defines “fee” based on revenue. Id.
143. See generally Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336
(1974) (holding federal statute authorized imposition of a fee, not a tax). In deciding whether an annual charge to communication antenna television systems was
properly a fee or an unconstitutional tax, the Supreme Court focused on the basis
on which the taxes and fees were issued. See id. at 337. Whereas fees are voluntarily exchanged for a unique benefit to the payer, taxes are implemented—even for
regulatory purposes—based on “public policy or interest served” rather than an
individual benefit. See id. at 340–41. “The lawmaker may, in light of the ‘public
policy or interest served’ make the assessment heavy if the lawmaker wants to discourage the activity . . . .” Id. at 341.
144. See generally Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1953) (distinguishing four features of a fee).
145. See id. at 188 (providing four-part test for licensing fees).
146. 571 A.2d 9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
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not fit within the state’s analytical framework but nevertheless determined
it to be a fee based on the support of only two factors.147
Stormwater charges present a fresh challenge for Pennsylvania courts
because they live between the opposed worlds of regulatory fees and general taxation.148 Fees pay for services benefitting the payer in a way not
experienced by the general public, and arguably this definition extends to
property owners required to pay stormwater charges.149 Looked at in the
context of stormwater, a naturally occurring process created by and affecting all properties differently, the degree to which properties benefit from
a system of stormwater control is unique to each property.150 If
stormwater systems are viewed as a municipally provided alternative to
property owners having to deal with their property’s stormwater discharges on an individual basis, it becomes more palatable to consider
stormwater charges as fees for a service rendered rather than a general
public benefit.151
But stormwater charges also bear characteristics of taxes.152 According to White, taxes are charges imposed by a legislature that raise money
for public purposes and offset government expenses.153 Because taxes are
147. See id. at 11 (holding plaintiff’s charge was “more logically” a fee than
tax); see also Nat’l Biscuit Co., 98 A.2d at 182 (defining license fee). In White, the
statute required doctors with most of their practice within Pennsylvania to pay into
a fund meant to reimburse victims of malpractice. White, 571 A.2d at 11–12. Plaintiff White, a doctor with a majority of his clients in the state, challenged the charge
as an unlawful tax implemented by a non-elected body. Id. at 10. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied National Biscuit’s definition of “fee” and concluded
the charge was properly a fee despite meeting only two of four prongs in the test.
Id. at 11.
148. See Law, supra note 20, at 36 (describing stormwater fees). Stormwater
fees have the features of both a tax and a fee. See id.
149. See id. at 31 (distinguishing fees from taxes). Jurisdictions often begin by
basing the fee-tax distinction on a single characteristic such as purpose or amount
spent before evolving the meaning through litigation. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra
note 114, at 186 (discussing characterization of charges).
150. See Law, supra note 20, at 37 (asserting that misunderstanding
stormwater leads courts to consider charges to be taxes).
151. See id. at 38 (“It also makes sense, in light of stormwater science, to impose the fee on all property owners unless they can prove that they really contain
all of their stormwater on-site.”).
152. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 185 (“It is frequently difficult to
discern whether a given enactment provides for a regulatory fee or authorizes simply a tax.” (citing McLeod v. Colombia County, 599 S.E.2d 152, 154 (Ga. 2004))).
Levies organized into general fund are more likely taxes. See id. Similarly, if the
levy raises surplus money, is intended to raise money, is involuntary, or collects a
large sum of money compared to the benefit received from paying, it is more likely
a tax. See id. “[A]ll properties within a city contribute to and receive a general and
specific benefit from a stormwater management system.” Law, supra note 20, at 37.
153. See White, 571 A.2d at 11 (“This Court however finds that the surcharge is
not a tax as its purpose is not to raise revenues for public purposes or to defray the
necessary expenses of government.”). Further, the court noted that taxes were
money-raising measures producing high income for the government compared to
the cost of collecting. See id. at 12
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meant to raise money and benefit the whole community, when a fee ceases
to merely recoup costs and generates large revenue for the legislature’s
general public or future capital improvements it can becomes a tax.154
Stormwater charges, sometimes called “rain taxes,” benefit the entire community by offsetting expenses for government infrastructure used by all
property owners in the municipality.155
Part of the difficulty in categorizing stormwater charges is that they
are neither taxes nor fees.156 Because of the duality of stormwater
charges, commentators sometimes categorize them into a third category,
Pigovian taxes, that is unacknowledged by the existing framework of municipal laws.157 Pigovian taxes are charges imposed to combat pollution
or congestion at a rate proportionate to the harm being caused, making
them difficult to categorize as general revenue-raising taxes.158 Nor are
they easily categorized as fees because the charge is not based on the service provided, but rather the cost a behavior imposes on society more generally.159 Stormwater charges may fit this mold because they incentivize
property owners to pollute less by raising the cost of certain behaviors (i.e.,
not treating or mitigating stormwater before it enters the sewer system)
based on how much that activity contributes to a societal ill.160 Unfortunately, that mold is one unacknowledged by Pennsylvania courts and municipalities, which see the question as one of taxes vs. fees.161
154. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 171–72 (distinguishing taxes
from fees); see also Law, supra note 20, at 36 (defining role of taxes). Courts determine whether a charge is a user fee by looking to its purpose, proportionality with
harm created, and voluntary nature. Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 186–87
(discussing characterization of charges).
155. See Law, supra note 20, at 34 (“[S]tormwater is something all properties
in a watershed create . . . .”); see also Raven Santana, Why Is a Stormwater Management
Bill Being Called a ‘Rain Tax’?, NJTV NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.njtvonline
.org/news/video/why-is-a-stormwater-management-bill-being-called-a-rain-tax/
[https://perma.cc/8MXM-XLFP] (explaining some dub stormwater fees as rain
taxes.).
156. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 170 (categorizing stormwater
charges as Pigovian taxes and highlighting varied state court reactions to them).
157. See id.
158. See Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 318.
159. See id. at 319 n.138 (discussing difficulty of fitting Pigovian fees into existing legal frameworks).
160. See Scharff, Green Fees, supra note 114, at 169–70 (explaining market
mechanics of stormwater fees).
161. See Borough of West Chester v. Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 260
M.D. 2018, 2019 WL 3069642 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 15, 2019) (determining demurrer based on tax-fee distinction). In Borough of West Chester, the Middle District
of Pennsylvania determined that the parties had not sufficiently answered whether
a stormwater charge provided a special benefit to respondent, whether the charge
was proportional to any benefit, and how the borough actually used funds generated under the banner of a “fee.” Id. at *13. Respondents challenged the
stormwater charge and argued it was a real estate tax assessed based on the property’s condition because it forced respondents to support water quality without
providing a benefit to the property. Id. at *7. The borough, implementing the fee
to raise money for pollution remediation, maintained that the charge was a fee
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Municipalities implement their charges with this ontological
minefield in mind, carefully crafting ordinances and public communications to highlight the fact that stormwater fees are tied to services being
performed by the city rather than to capital improvements.162 They announce the new charge as an equitable alternate to taxation driven by
regulatory need, focusing on its limited application to landowners as evidence that the charge is a fee, not a tax.163 Moreover, many municipalities allow property owners to offset the charge by minimizing the
stormwater running off their land through the use of green infrastructure
such as rain gardens, and green roofs.164
With many townships and boroughs are incapable of raising
stormwater fees, regional collaboration through water authorities became
assessed against properties, including the respondent’s, that used and benefited
from the MS4. Id. at *3–4; see also Emily Opilo, Allentown Doubles Down in Airport
Stormwater Dispute, Demands Interest Payment, THE MORNING CALL (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.mcall.com/news/local/allentown/mc-nws-allentown-airport-lawsuitcounterclaim-20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/5CSK-53GA] (describing
stormwater charge dispute as legal fight over whether charge is tax or fee).
162. See City of Allentown, Frequently Asked Questions About Stormwater 1
(2017), https://www.allentownpa.gov/Portals/0/files/Water/FrequentlyAskedQuestions.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z3U-S47K] (explaining Allentown’s
stormwater fee). Allentown, Pennsylvania implemented a stormwater fee in 2017
to support the operation and maintenance of its MS4 on a level that complied with
NPDES regulations. See id. The stormwater fee will fund MS4 operation and maintenance, infrastructure repair, and state- and federally-mandated water conservation activities. See id. Allentown bases its fee off the estimated impervious surface
area on city properties, charging $20 per 500 square feet of impervious area. See
id. at 2. Imposing a fee schedule allows the city to charge property owners with
similar, highly impervious surface areas a comparable amount at a higher rate than
individuals with smaller footprints. See id.
163. See Federal & State Mandates Increase, LOWER PAXTON TOWNSHIP, https://
www.lowerpaxton-pa.gov/stormwater-fee-2019 [https://perma.cc/KY2K-CG5L]
(last visited Nov. 27, 2019) (discussing how levied money will be a fee not a tax).
Lower Paxton promotes its fee, which is run through the township’s water authority, as more equitable than a tax. See id. Whereas tax-exempt entities owning impervious stretches of property could escape responsibility under a tax, fees ensure
everyone buys into compliance measures. See id.; see also LEMOYNE BOROUGH, REHABILITATING OUR WATERWAYS 1 (2019), https://www.lemoynepa.com/sites/
lemoynepa/files/uploads/stormwater-tri-fold-02-07-2019-final.pdf [permalink unavailable] (describing purpose and collection mechanism of stormwater “assessment”). Lemoyne Borough chose a fee assessment because relying on taxes would
force the borough to decrease its general budget spending in other areas. See id. at
2.
164. See McKinstry, supra note 21, at 10,830 (discussing Philadelphia’s plan to
incentivize property owners to implement green infrastructure); Salzman, supra
note 112, at 30–31 (noting Philadelphia gives green infrastructure offsets for
stormwater fees); see also Stormwater Credit Program, CARLISLE BOROUGH, https://
www.carlislepa.org/residents/stormwater_management/stormwater_credit_program.php [https://perma.cc/BSJ5-G3FT] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (offering fee
credit program on newly implemented program). But see, e.g., Will Credits Be Offered?, LEMOYNE BOROUGH, https://www.lemoynepa.com/stormwater/faq/willcredits-be-offered [permalink unavailable] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (declining to
offer credit program until the borough has enough money).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5

248

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: p. 223

an increasingly popular choice to reduce costs.165 But different local
needs, management styles, and sewer systems threaten to make collaboration a waste of time and money.166 Municipalities may be unable to provide resources equitably across jurisdictions either because they are too
small to fix such large problems or simply because they lack
communication.167
B.

The Golden Goose: Regulating with a Smile in Farmland

Meanwhile, the DEP’s NPDES permitting program extends only to a
small portion of CAFOs in a watershed with 33,000 farms.168 Because
most farms cannot be controlled by stormwater permitting, state agencies
regulate in other ways.169 Nutrient management programs tackle pollutants stemming from manure while other programs offer advice and grant
money in exchange for voluntary improvements.170
165. See Law, supra note 20, at 60 (noting cost-efficiency in partnerships).
166. See id. at 60–61 (describing inefficiencies in teamwork). Nevertheless,
collaboration does make costs cheaper per person by virtue of economies of scale.
See id.
167. See Salzman, supra note 112, at 5 (comparing reasons for inequitable distribution of ecosystem services).
168. See 25 PA. CODE § 92a.29 (setting limits to NPDES permitting); see also
Chesapeake Bay Strategy, PA. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.agriculture.pa.gov/
Plants_Land_Water/StateConservationCommission/Pages/Chesapeake-Bay.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WG8A-X5SV] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019) (discussing Pennsylvania’s important role in cleaning up the watershed).
169. See Agriculture, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., https://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Water/Pennsylvania%E2%80%99s%20Chesapeake%20Bay%20Program%20Office/
agriculture/Pages/Agriculture.aspx [https://perma.cc/25YU-T32J] (last visited
Sept. 12, 2019) (highlighting agricultural efforts to reduce Bay pollution). Besides
NPDES permitting, farmers implement BMPs in conjunction with state programs
or on their own initiative. See id.
170. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE CHESAPEAKE BAY AGRICULTURAL INSPECTION PROGRAM 1 (2018), http://files.dep.state.pa
.us/Water/BPNPSM/AgriculturalOperations/AgriculturalCompliance/Final_SOP
_Chesapeake_Bay_Agricultural_Inspection_Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/
MGL7-VMQA] (explaining procedures used to inspect agricultural operations
under Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law); see also PENN STATE EXTENSION, Nutrient
Management Legislation in Pennsylvania: A Summary of the 2006 Regulations 1 (last
visited Sept. 12, 2019), https://extension.psu.edu/programs/nutrient-management/act-38-law-and-regulations/nutrient-management-legislation-in-pennsylvania-a-summary-of-the-2006-regulations [https://perma.cc/V6PA-EJX6]
(explaining Act 38 Nutrient Management Plan Act); see also Caitlin Finnerty, Sustainable Farming in Lancaster County, Pa., CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM (Aug. 1, 2012),
https://www.chesapeakebay.net/news/article/from_the_field_farming_for_the_
future_in_lancaster_county_pa [https://perma.cc/PVD5-ZB63] (noting economic
efficiency of sustainable farming practices). While CAFOs are regulated under
Pennsylvania’s Act 38, the approximately 95% of agricultural operations remaining
in the state are under no obligation to comply. See PENN STATE EXTENSION, supra,
at 2 (explaining voluntary implementation of nutrient management plans).
Whether compliance is mandatory or voluntary, agricultural operations must work
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Because the agricultural sector was a significant reason for Pennsylvania’s ongoing noncompliance, DEP programs focused on creating incentives for farmers to participate in conservation efforts.171 Although the
Agricultural Inspection Program, which checks for compliance with sediment and manure management laws, covers all farms across Pennsylvania’s
section of the Chesapeake Bay watershed, it has not yet reached its proposed 10% annual rate of farm inspections.172 Other programs have had
varying degrees of effectiveness.173
Legislative action, though slow, more often supports farmers while restricting MS4s.174 Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf signed the PA Farm
Bill in 2019, which addresses the state’s TMDL funding gap while protecting farmers from additional costs.175 And after several years of legislative
with a certified nutrient management specialist to develop a plan in the state-approved format. See id. at 2
171. See ENVTL. FIN. CTR., UNIV. OF MD., FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WATER
QUALITY PROTECTION AND RESTORATION ON AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN PENNSYLVANIA
8–18 (Sept. 2016), https://www.chesapeakebay.net/channel_files/23872/financial_incentives_for_conservation_on_ag_lands_9-28-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
782D-MVR5] (discussing financial incentives for private agricultural operations).
172. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., ANNUAL SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL INSPECTIONS JULY 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2017 (2017), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/
ChesapeakeBayOffice/FINAL_CBAIP_Annual%20Summary_June.17.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZWA8-8Q2W] (summarizing implementation results of program). Nevertheless, over 10% of total acreage within the watershed was inspected. See id.
173. See WHAT IS REAP?, PA. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.agriculture.pa.gov/
Plants_Land_Water/StateConservationCommission/REAP/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/27BA-DAE7] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (summarizing Resource
Enhancement and Protection Program eligibility requirements and BMPs covered); see also Russell Redding, Conservation in Pennsylvania’s Ag Industry: Leading by
Example, LANCASTERFARMING.COM (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.lancasterfarming
.com/news/columnists/conservation-in-pennsylvania-s-ag-industry-leading-by-example/article_df47861e-755e-5b23-9cf7-37988498c3a8.html [https://perma.cc/
6NC8-YT5U] (touting PA Farm Bill’s “direct investments in conservation”); Nutrient Management Program, PA. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.agriculture.pa.gov/
Plants_Land_Water/StateConservationCommission/NutrientManagementProgram/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8VT8-DLEN] (last visited Oct. 4,
2019) (summarizing focus of PA Act 38 Nutrient Management Program). The Resource Enhancement and Protection (REAP) Program is proving a popular way for
farmers to earn tax credits by installing BMPs. See Redding, supra.
174. Compare Senator Gene Yah, Memorandum to All Pennsylvania Senate
Members (May 07, 2019), https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/Legis/CSM/
showMemoPublic.cfm?chamber=S&SPick=20190&cosponId=29521 [https://per
ma.cc/E8VA-SFCA] (announcing intent to re-introduce legislation regulating urban fertilizer use), with 3 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101–3110 (2019) (providing $2.5
million in assistance to farmers developing BMPs). Similar urban fertilizer legislation, S.B. 792, passed in the Senate but died in the House during the 2017–2018
legislative term. See S.B. 792, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018) (as
amended by Senate, March 19, 2018).
175. See PA Press Release, Pa. Governor’s Office, Governor Wolf Announces $28
Million to Improve Local Water Quality (Oct. 04, 2016), https://www.governor.pa
.gov/newsroom/governor-wolf-announces-a-new-statefederal-partnership-to-bring28-million-to-help-farmers-in-bay-watershed-improve-local-water-quality [https://
perma.cc/LRL5-6TA3] (announcing grants, loans, and tax incentives to help farm-
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standstill, Pennsylvania’s General Assembly passed legislation establishing
the Conservation Excellence Grant Program for farmers in the Bay
watershed.176
C.

Phase III—The Final Say in Watershed Implementation Plans

Pennsylvania’s Phase III Draft WIP—a combined effort between the
DEP, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Conservation
and Natural Resources—focused on local water quality improvements and
was widely criticized by environmentalists and Chesapeake Bay partners.177 Introducing the final leg of TMDL project, the Phase III WIP lays
out the Commonwealth’s final push toward environmental compliance.178
Yet the difference between available funds and programming costs raised a
red flag that the Commonwealth might not be able to live up to its
promises.179
The draft plan showed the state operating at a $256 million gap between money needed and funds available to drive TMDL reductions.180
Further, the plan’s verified BMPs were insufficient to even reach the
TMDL goal.181 The Commonwealth also relied on self-initiated plans by
private parties that could not be verified under existing programs.182
Reviews were mixed.183 Maryland stakeholders and the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation took the alleged draft plan inadequacies as a sign Penners implement BMPs); see also PA Farm Bill, PA. DEP’T AGRIC. https://www.agriculture.pa.gov/Pages/PA-Farm-Bill.aspx [https://perma.cc/P44P-QWD4] (last visited
Nov. 26, 2019) (outlining six ways Pennsylvania Farm Bill helps farmers).
176. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101–3110 (2019).
177. See, e.g., Viviano, supra note 11 (criticizing Pennsylvania’s Watershed Implementation Plan as inadequate); Finley, supra note 11 (expressing commentator’s assertions that Pennsylvania must do more to reduce Bay pollution).
178. See FINAL PHASE III supra note 103, at 15–17 (defending Phase I and II
efforts while setting steps to take through 2025).
179. See id. at 4 (discussing investment need to fill state funding gap); see also
Viviano, supra note 11 (criticizing Pennsylvania’s restoration efforts and funding
gap); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DRAFT PHASE 3 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
4 (2019) [hereinafter DRAFT PHASE III], http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/
ChesapeakeBayOffice/WIPIII/DraftPlan/PA_Phase_3_WIP_FinalDraft.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4GU-CY5Z] (discussing investment need to fill state funding
gap).
180. See DRAFT PHASE III, supra note 179, at 9 (discussing funding gap).
181. See Pennsylvania’s Watershed Implementation Plan, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND.,
https://www.cbf.org/how-we-save-the-bay/chesapeake-clean-water-blueprint/statewatershed-implementation-plans/pennsylvania/ [https://perma.cc/E348-YBTH]
(last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (critiquing Draft Phase III WIP for not achieving nitrogen load reductions or necessary funding).
182. See DRAFT PHASE III, supra note 179, at 26 (describing engagement strategy). The DEP put emphasis on private initiatives to create awareness and promote action. See id. Other non-regulatory plans included ecosystem restoration
projects and the improvement of soil health. See id.
183. Compare ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S DRAFT
PHASE III WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1–2, 4 (2019) [hereinafter EPA,
DRAFT EVALUATION] (highlighting strengths of Draft Phase III WIP), with Viviano,
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sylvania was not serious about its commitment.184 Fed up, the two groups
published blistering op-eds that threatened legal action should Pennsylvania not present a stronger Phase III WIP.185 Under the Trump Administration, the EPA took a more lenient approach, commending the
Commonwealth for its past efforts and looking forward to its final word.186
IV. CARROTS & STICKS: A HARD LOOK AT PENNSYLVANIA’S
FINAL PHASE III WIP
Pennsylvania’s focus on meeting CWA water quality standards in its
Final Phase III WIP by imposing stricter requirements on MS4s without
overseeing agricultural programs does not provide “reasonable assurance”
that the Commonwealth will meet its Chesapeake Bay TMDL.187 With just
six years to fulfill ambitious pollution goals, municipalities face pressure to
make bad financial decisions to maintain their NPDES permits.188 Yet,
despite farms being the major source of pollution, the Commonwealth
supra note 11 (noting negative reactions to Draft Phase III WIP). The EPA highlighted key strengths and enhancements that would “provide greater confidence to
the CBP partnership and the public that Pennsylvania will have programs and
practices in place by 2025 that will promote achievement of its Phase III WIP planning targets.” EPA, DRAFT EVALUATION, supra, at 4.
184. See Blankenship, supra note 12 (discussing missing reassurances in Pennsylvania’s draft WIP). The EPA criticized Pennsylvania’s plan because of its failure
to address how the state would pursue the missing $256 million annual funding
gap. See id.; see also Viviano, supra note 11 (reporting on Maryland Governor Larry
Hogan’s call for Pennsylvania to be held accountable). The draft Phase III WIP
lacked a plan to reach the state’s 2025 requirement, accounting for only two-thirds
of the necessary nitrogen reduction. See Blankenship, supra note 12. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation called Pennsylvania the “weakest link” in the TMDL undertaking, noting that the state’s projected results assumed private citizens would take
unmonitored action. See Viviano, supra note 11.
185. See Baltimore Sun Editorial Board, Let’s Sue Pennsylvania, THE BALT. SUN
(July 15, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-pennsylvania-chesapeake-20190715-7asfosvmfnbsjokvtaua65xiiq-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/E23J-RJFA] (calling out Pennsylvania and EPA for underperforming); Press
Release, CBF Report: The State of the Blueprint, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND. (May 28,
2019), https://www.cbf.org/news-media/newsroom/2019/all/cbf-report-the-stateof-the-blueprint.html
[https://perma.cc/K4K9-4S38] (calling Pennsylvania’s
Draft Phase III WIP “woefully inadequate”). But see Letter from Larry Hogan, Maryland Governor, to Tom Wolf, Pennsylvania Governor (May 28, 2019) (offering to
rally “financial and regulatory support”).
186. See DRAFT EVALUATION, supra note 183, at 1–4 (highlighting strengths of
Pennsylvania’s draft plan and providing potential enhancements to plan); see also
Whitney Pipkin, Chesapeake Cleanup Leaders Meet Without Tackling PA’s Funding
Shortfall, BAY J. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.bayjournal.com/article/chesapeake_cleanup_leaders_meet_without_tackling_pas_funding_shortfall [https://
perma.cc/4TYF-2ZN7] (holding off criticism until after full review).
187. See Blankenship, supra note 12 (noting Pennsylvania had six years to
achieve roughly six times nitrogen reductions made in previous ten years). With
approximately 34 million pounds of nitrogen left to eliminate by 2025, Pennsylvania’s annual funding gap alarmed the EPA. See id.
188. For a further discussion of the financial strain municipalities face funding stormwater improvements, see supra notes 112–139 and accompanying text.
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continues to encourage the voluntary compliance of agricultural operations by offering money through government programs that cannot manage the promised review, verification, or funding.189
A.

Oversight and Enforcement: A Last Resort

The DEP’s oversight of environmental programs is insufficient to
drive Phase III pollution reduction goals.190 It does not have a grasp on
agricultural compliance with its environmental programs.191 Without staying in touch with independent farming practices, the state cannot develop
cost-effective incentive programs.192
Despite acknowledging “Pennsylvania must change its approach for
the Chesapeake Bay,” the DEP is still pursuing a carrot-before-the-stick approach to regulating non-point source polluters.193 In 2016, when the
DEP already knew agricultural runoff was a significant reason for the
state’s lagging conservation efforts, Pennsylvania allocated more money to
the problem without ensuring its existing programs were being implemented effectively.194 Of the 33,000 farms in the watershed, the state’s
Agriculture Inspection Program had only visited 2,080 farmsteads not already monitored by an NPDES permit.195
189. For a further discussion on agricultural legislation, see supra notes
212–214 and accompanying text.
190. For further discussion on the financial strain on municipalities to fund
improvements, see supra notes 112–139 and accompanying text; see also Eide, Fiscal
Distress, supra note 110, at 3 (proposing state oversight would reduce fiscal distress
and prevent municipal bankruptcy).
191. See ENVTL. FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 7–8 (discussing monitoring of private agricultural operations); see also Finley, supra note 11 (accusing EPA of not
monitoring Pennsylvania’s state programs).
192. See ENVTL. FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 7–8 (observing incentive programs
without measurable compliance are ineffective). For many years the DEP focused
on creating a “culture of compliance” among farmers who could not be regulated
under the Clean Water Act, attempting to inspire change through public opinion
rather than regulation. See id. But the DEP found it difficult to effectively track
BMPs undertaken independently of state programs, undercutting its measure of
effectiveness. See id.
193. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 208; see also Houck, supra note
5, at 10,212 (discussing existing government approaches offering cash payouts).
194. See Pa. Governor’s Office, supra note 175 (announcing new team-up to
provide financing to watershed pollution reduction efforts). The $12 million in
state funding was part of a partnership with the EPA and the USDA. See id. The
effort “aligns closely” with Pennsylvania’s Chesapeake Bay Restoration Strategy,
which was announced earlier in 2016. See id.
195. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., DRAFT 2018 PENN. INTEGRATED WATER
QUALITY MONITORING & ASSISTANCE REPORT (2018), https://www.depgis.state.pa
.us/2018_integrated_report/index.html [https://perma.cc/3QEA-NT22]
(describing Pennsylvania’s evolving efforts to monitor farms). The state relies on
remote sensing, surveys, and self-assessments to determine whether farmers are
self-funding conservation practices without inspecting the property. See ENVTL.
FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 7 (critiquing Pennsylvania’s monitoring program as
ineffective).
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While state law technically limits manure application to quantities
plants need and can use, without oversight farmers are free to ignore this
“agronomic rate” provision without recourse.196 What amounts to an exemption of agricultural producers initially looks like a benefit to small and
mid-sized farms.197 But because of market concentration it means largescale polluters suffer no penalty for wasteful, damaging practices while
smaller farms still have difficulty budgeting for eco-friendly practices.198
Legislative efforts also fail to rein in pollution or support municipalities.199 Legislation passed in 2019 promising money to farms making conservation efforts offered little comfort to Chesapeake Bay partners.200 The
statute’s text suggests that on-the-ground inspections will fall to county
level conservation districts and cautions that grants will be available only if
the Pennsylvania General Assembly makes funds available.201
Moreover, nine years after the EPA implemented the TMDL, state
lawmakers are still apprehensive about the department’s strategy and how
the mandate affects municipalities.202 Thanks to years of neglect, state
legislators are not alone.203 One township official called the mandate’s
196. See Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Land Application
of Sewage Sludge: A Guide for Land Appliers on the Requirements of the Federal
Standards for the Use or Disposal of Sewage Sludge, 40 C.F.R. Part 503 1–3 (1994),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-11/documents/land-application-sewage-sludge.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZA2Q-P7G5] (explaining federal regulation of biosolids as applied to agricultural land). Biosolids cannot be applied to
agricultural land in excess of rates necessary to promote plant growth or when
application would put the agricultural operation above a cumulative load rating.
See id. at 3, 14; see also Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,856 (highlighting lack of environmental accountability in farming).
197. See Lehner, supra note 52, at 10,862 (highlighting heightened state requirements disadvantaging small farms).
198. See id. at 10,867–68 (criticizing factory farms for taking advantage of
loose regulations).
199. See H.B. 473–474, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019) (referred to
Local Government committee Feb. 11, 2019). The bills would allow a wider range
of municipalities to directly implement fees. See id.
200. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101–3110 (2019) (establishing Conservation
Excellence Grant Program); Letter from Larry Hogan, Maryland Governor, to
Tom Wolf, Pennsylvania Governor, and Andrew Wheeler, Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 29, 2019) (urging stakeholders not to waiver
in protection of Chesapeake Bay).
201. See 3 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3107–3108 (2019) (promising money through
tax credits, loans, and grants). The Soil and Conservation Excellence Grant Program allows the state to delegate responsibilities and duties to county conservation
districts. See id. § 3108(d) (allowing delegation of inspection to agent).
202. See generally Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2 (discussing municipal approaches to stormwater).
203. See Chelsea Strub, ‘End the Rain Tax’ Group Fighting Stormwater Fee, WNEP
(June 10, 2019), https://wnep.com/2019/06/10/end-the-rain-tax-group-fightingstormwater-fee/ [https://perma.cc/62FQ-9EN8] (reporting citizen outrage over
new stormwater runoff fee); An Unfunded Mandate Primer & MS-4 Storm-Water E.P.A.
Nightmare Stormwater, NORAINTAX.ORG (Apr. 26, 2019), https://noraintax.org/u/f/
an-unfunded-mandate-primer-ms-4-storm-water-epa-nightmare [https://perma.cc/
Q7A8-YUVT] (expressing outrage that water authorities cannot be audited).
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permitting requirements an “expensive reduction that can be difficult to
quantify and challenging to achieve.”204
B.

Inequity of High Speed, High Stakes MS4 Regulation

Pennsylvania’s increasing point source regulations benefit resourcerich communities with stronger tax bases over smaller and low-income
communities.205 Without tax authority, municipalities rely on user fees to
raise revenue.206 Stormwater user fees are well-suited to support small,
recurring costs such as garbage collection rather than capital improvement costs.207 Municipalities renewing their permits after requirements
became tougher have to raise larger, riskier fees to meet the high capital
cost of infrastructure repair in a shorter window.208 Due to the monstrous
costs of infrastructure repair and development, municipalities may look
beyond fees to larger initiatives such as municipal bonds.209 But while
bonds provide upfront capital, investors may require small, resource poor
communities to pay higher interest rates to make up for the fact they are
less likely to make the payments.210 Ultimately, utilizing bonds means
poorer communities will pay more in the end for the same improvements
as better situated ones, incurring more financial risk just to meet the same
requirements.211 Struggling municipalities are not equipped to adapt to
stormwater regulations by issuing bonds and will fare poorly if forced to
borrow funds.212
204. Stormwater Hearings, supra note 2, at 82 (testimony of Andrew Boni, Perry
Township Supervisor and Second Vice President of Pennsylvania State Association
of Township Supervisors).
205. Cf. Scharff, Powerful Cities, supra note 113, at 342 (discussing inequitable
distribution of tax power).
206. See id. at 302–03 (explaining shift to reliance on user fees).
207. See Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, supra note 113, at 671–72 (noting
municipalities may need largescale capital before fees raise revenue).
208. See Sarah Gisriel, Lower Paxton Proposes $128 Stormwater Fee for Residents,
ABC 27 NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.abc27.com/news/local/harrisburg/
lower-paxton-proposes-128-stormwater-fee-for-residents/ [https://perma.cc/85U8569Z] (explaining township’s proposed fee offers no exceptions). For more discussion on the difference between taxes and fees, see Section III.A.1 supra.
209. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (highlighting large costs incurred by smaller municipalities); see also PENNFUTURE, FUNDING STORMWATER MANAGEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA MUNICIPALITIES 7 (2017) (critiquing municipal bonds
and loan programs as unstable).
210. See Rosenbloom, Funding Adaptation, supra note 113, at 681 (“Economically distressed cities may also pay a higher cost for borrowing because their bonds
may carry higher risk, and thus a higher interest rate.”).
211. See id. at 659–60 (discussing difficulties of funding stormwater infrastructure repairs).
212. See id. at 681 (discussing ways municipal bonding is incompatible with
goals adaptation). Municipal bonding is most effective when funding economic
development capable of generating a positive return on investment. Id. at 680.
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The fates of the Chesapeake Bay and Pennsylvania municipalities are
in the hands of national and state politics.213 Under the current presidential administration, the EPA is focused on de-regulation.214 Nevertheless,
the EPA has the power to implement stronger regulatory actions on measurable discharges from point source outflows.215 Moreover, it already
threatened to cover more municipalities under NPDES permits and has
set even higher standards on existing permittees following Pennsylvania’s
failure to meet the 2017 milestone.216
Pennsylvania’s Democratic Governor promises environmental progress but is hampered by the economic realities of the farming industry,
213. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Administration Finalizes Repeal of 2015
Water Rule Trump Called ‘Destructive and Horrible’, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 11,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/administration-finalizes-repeal-of-2015-water-rule-trump-called-destructive-and-horrible/2019/09/
11/fddfa49a-d4aa-11e9-9343-40db57cf6abd_story.html [https://perma.cc/U5ALYABD] (noting politically charged nature of federal environmental regulations).
The meaning of “waters” under the CWA is a hot topic in environmental law subject to much debate and litigation. See id. The Trump Administration is rolling
back Clean Water Act regulations by contracting the definition of “waters of the
U.S.” See id. Previously, the Obama Administration had expanded the definition
of “waters” to include wetlands, various ditches, and stormwater controls. See id.
Five of six states in the Bay watershed operate under the Obama-era standard, but
even so, “tens of thousands of acres that connect underground or through ditches
to nearby waterways will lose protection” with the repeal, potentially affecting the
Bay’s restoration. See id.; see also Press Release, What They Are Saying About EPA’s
New Methane Proposal, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/what-they-are-saying-about-epas-new-methane-proposal [https://per
ma.cc/2NNK-M9YN] (quoting political support for relaxing methane limits).
214. See Eilperin & Dennis, supra note 213 (explaining Trump Administration’s aggressive efforts to decrease federal environmental oversight). Within
months of entering office, President Trump directed the EPA to review the 2015
rule with an eye toward repealing it. See id. The Trump Administration also relaxed numerous environmental protections on oil, gas, and emissions. See id.;
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2020 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 59 (2019), https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2019-03/documents/fy-2020-epa-bib.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/GFT3-BWQK] (proposing 90% decrease in federal funding of Chesapeake
Bay restoration).
215. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL 7-1 to -4 (2010) [hereinafter EPA, TMDL Section 7], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201412/documents/cbay_final_tmdl_section_7_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7UBUPQ] (discussing WIP structure and federal action to ensure compliance); see
also PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., A DEP STRATEGY TO ENHANCE PENNSYLVANIA’S CHESAPEAKE BAY RESTORATION EFFORT 5–7 (2016), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Water/
ChesapeakeBayOffice/DEP%20Chesapeake%20Bay%20Restoration%20Strategy
%20012116.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY5S-KDPW] (reacting to EPA backstop measures); see also ENVTL. FIN. CTR., supra note 9, at 6 (discussing EPA’s previous backstop measures following Pennsylvania’s non-compliance).
216. See EPA TMDL Section 7, supra note 215, at 7-12 (listing potential actions
available to ensure states develop and implement adequate WIPs); EPA EVALUATION, supra note 89, at 4 (encouraging the use of permits). First on the EPA’s list
of potential actions is broader and stricter oversight of NDPES permittees. See EPA
TMDL, Section 7, supra note 215.
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which has suffered in recent years, and politics.217 Additionally, the General Assembly is becoming more polarized and passing less legislation
overall.218 Moreover, instead of pressuring large pollution producers,
state agencies continue to rely on voluntary measures and the low-hanging
fruit of point source pollution control to lower Pennsylvania’s pollution
levels.219 Because of the state’s failure to change gears despite years of
high-level planning, both small municipalities and their residents are asking, “What should we do?”220
217. See 2014 AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 1 (committing Pennsylvania to
improving Bay water quality). The 2014 Chesapeake Bay Partnership Agreement
committed the cost-effective results to Bay pollution. 2014 AGREEMENT, supra note
79. With farms hit hard in recent years by crop failure, low pricing, and tariffs, the
going has not been easy. See Blankenship, supra note 12 (discussing roadblocks to
Pennsylvania’s water quality goals). York County announced in 2019 that the 2025
goal “would not be met.” See id. Pennsylvania defended its efforts after releasing
the Draft Phase III WIP, blaming the federal government and non-profits for not
contributing to state efforts. See Finley, supra note 11; Justine McDaniel, Here’s
What Pennsylvania Is Doing to Address Climate Change—and Why Politics Is Making it
Difficult, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/pennsylvania-climate-change-governor-wolf-carbon-state-action-20190918.html [https:/
/perma.cc/PVD2-6EPU] (discussing gap between policy creation and
implementation).
218. See Chris Brennan, Pa. House and Senate Remain in Republican Control Despite Democratic Gains, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/
philly/news/politics/elections/elections-2018-pennsylvania-legislature-resultshouse-senate-20181106.html [https://perma.cc/FS4B-92AF] (noting Republican
control of General Assembly since 2010); see also Jonathan Lai & Liz Navratil, Pa.
State Lawmakers Among the Highest Paid in U.S., But They’re Doing Less and Less Actual
Lawmaking, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/
pennsylvania/spl/pa-legislature-highest-paid-largest-bills-legislation-partisanship20190913.html [https://perma.cc/4PHR-676M] (identifying 20% decrease in bills
introduced since 1990s).
219. See 2014 AGREEMENT, supra note 79, at 2 (committing to “acknowledge,
support, and embrace local governments”). Despite Pennsylvania’s pledge, concern about the “rain tax” is spreading through central Pennsylvania. See Stormwater
Hearing, supra note 2, at 5–6 (noting growing concern over regulations by smalltown residents). Lebanon Mayor Sherry Capello observed that the TMDL’s emphasis on adaptive management translated to small municipalities at the end of the
line being asked to pay to hit moving targets. See id. at 59–71 (testimony of Sherry
Capello, City of Lebanon Mayor). A township supervisor further testified to the
inefficiencies: MS4s in the Chesapeake Bay watershed spend $74 million annually
for current requirements but account for less than 1% of nitrogen and 2% of phosphorous reductions. See id. at 82 (testimony of Andrew Boni, Perry Township Supervisor and Second Vice President of Pennsylvania State Association of Township
Supervisors).
220. Stormwater Hearing, supra note 2, at 82 (testimony of Andrew Boni, Perry
Township Supervisor and Second Vice President of Pennsylvania State Association
of Township Supervisors) (asking “what should we do?”); see PENNSYLVANIA STATE
ASSOCIATION OF TOWNSHIP SUPERVISORS, PSATS’ 2019 LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES 3
(2019), http://psats.org.s97340.gridserver.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/
2019%20Legislative%20Priorities_LowRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y24-2W3M]
(asking General Assembly for flexibility and a two-year moratorium on passing new
MS4 regulations). The Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors
continues to lobby for legislative relief from EPA and DEP regulations, requesting
“equitable and proportional allocation of the responsibility” between point source
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The question is one few communities in the Bay watershed are in a
position to answer satisfactorily for their constituents.221 Most counties
face the triple threat of falling population numbers, an aging populace,
and a higher-than-average poverty rate.222 Resources are slim, and decreasing even as expectations rise.223
Municipalities answered the question by spreading the cost among
residents.224 In Lemoyne Borough, the minimum residential payment is
$7.70 per month, or $92 annually.225 Carlisle Borough imposed a tiered
fee system to fund stormwater improvements that costs single family residences up to $126 annually and potentially much more to businesses.226
Lower Paxton Township, arriving late in the game, imposed its $128 fee
without offering credit for on-site improvements.227 The longer municipalities wait, the faster they will need to raise money and the harder it will
and non-point source pollution. See PENNSYLVANIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF TOWNSHIP SUPERVISORS, supra at 3; see also Pipkin, supra note 186 (expressing uncertainty
toward Pennsylvania’s commitment to Bay restoration). While the EPA reserved
criticism for after its plan review, Maryland governor Larry Hogan told Pennsylvania to step it up and urged the EPA to make sure the state complied. See
Pipkin, supra note 186. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation called the situation “a
600-pound gorilla in the room that was ignored.” Id.
221. See, e.g., Jennifer Learn-Andes, More Outrage over Stormwater Fee as WVSA
Continues to Make Changes, TIMES LEADER (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.timesleader
.com/news/732117/more-outrage-over-stormwater-fee-as-wvsa-continues-to-makechanges [https://perma.cc/8MWE-4FDU] (noting residents are expressing concern to local, state, and federal officials); Sean Sauro, The Cost of Rain: More Towns
Ask Property Owners to Pay for Stormwater Plans, PENNLIVE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://
www.pennlive.com/news/2019/02/the-cost-of-rain-more-townships-boroughs-asking-property-owners-to-pay-for-stormwater-plans.html [https://perma.cc/J3K6WFWJ] (discussing difficulties the unfunded mandate creates for municipalities
and citizens).
222. See Statistics for Pennsylvania Counties and Municipalities, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/en.html [https://perma.cc/5XD4-XAMX] (follow
“Data” hyperlink; then click “Data Tools & Apps;” click “QuickFacts” and search by
state, county, or municipality) (comparing poverty, age, and population to Commonwealth average).
223. See id. (showing majority of watershed counties with higher than average
percentage of persons in poverty and decreasing populations compared to Commonwealth); see also Laura McCrystal, Pennsylvania’s Population Is Aging. Who Is Going to Pay for It?, PHILIA. INQUIRER (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/
philly/news/pennsylvania/pennsylvanias-population-is-aging-who-is-going-to-payfor-it-20180115.html [https://perma.cc/J988-MJLP] (discussing how an aging
populace erodes the tax base and strains local government services).
224. For a further discussion of stormwater fees implemented by municipalities across the Commonwealth, see supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
225. See LEMOYNE BOROUGH, supra note 163 (setting maximum annual increased cost for residential property owners at $554.40).
226. See CARLISLE BOROUGH, supra note 164 (setting business fee structure
based on impervious area).
227. See Gisriel, supra note 208 (proposing a fee to fund annual improvements
of $3.8 million).
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become to raise a stormwater fee that does not look like a tax.228 With
uncertainty in the air, one thing is for sure: in the Chesapeake Bay, there
is still much work to do.229
228. For a further discussion on the comparison between tax and fee features,
see supra notes 140–161 and accompanying text.
229. See William Baker, Time’s Running Out to Meet Bay Cleanup Goals, Especially
in PA, BAY J. (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.bayjournal.com/article/times_running
_out_to_meet_bay_cleanup_goals_especially_in_pa [https://perma.cc/38A52PYV] (warning road to completing conservation efforts has substantial challenges); cf. OLIVER, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing environment in form of poetry).
“Pennsylvania has the opportunity to be the Bay’s hero.” Baker, supra.
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